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Foreword by the EBA 
Around the year 2000, budget support was considered to be the 
effective and often preferred aid modality. Used at the discretion of 
recipient governments, normally accompanied with policy dialogue, 
budget support is arguably the aid instrument that best complies 
with the principles of aid effectiveness. Following Swedish 
government priorities, it increased up to 2008. However, after that 
it decreased dramatically and by 2016, no general budget support 
was provided by Sweden. A similar change is apparent in the aid 
portfolio of other donor countries.  
Budget support has an important role to play in the debate on 
effectiveness and harmonization of development aid, not least at the 
European level. In many cases, budget support is the preferred 
modality by partner country governments (see, for example, EBA 
2016:09). It is based on trust and ownership and avoids parallel 
structures and processes by using recipient countries’ systems. It has 
been considered to have low transaction costs, coordination gains 
and a potential to strengthen dialogue with poor countries' 
governments. However, while having strong supporters and backing 
in international agreements, it has also been depicted as risky and 
fostering corruption. Thus, budget support is controversial among 
Swedish policy makers as well as in the public debate.  
In this review of evidence, Professor Geske Dijkstra shows that 
the decline in budget support to a large extent is explained by factors 
in donor countries rather than by lack of evidence on effectiveness 
or limitations in its possibilities to reduce poverty. The author 
concludes that budget support has contributed to non-income 
poverty reduction and that its resources, and sometimes the 
dialogue as well, have facilitated more expenditure for the priority 
sectors. “This has led to more class rooms, more drug availability, 
and more staff for education and health. In turn, this has 
contributed to higher school enrolment rates, to more gender 
equality in access to primary education, to more access to health 
services, and more access to water and sanitation. In some countries, 
access to secondary education significantly improved as well. In 
many countries there were also improvements in outcomes such as 
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primary school completion rates, immunization rates, infant and 
child mortality rates, and maternal mortality rates”. In addition, 
“contrary to the many expectations on the high fiduciary risks of 
budget support, there is no evidence that it increased corruption”.  
The review demonstrates how challenging it has been for the 
donor community to uphold the aid effectiveness principles in the 
light of political opinions and considerations in donor countries. 
Often withdrawal of budget support has been used as an, 
ineffective, punishment of recipient countries’ non-compliance with 
donor priorities.  
The study raises pertinent questions about learning and the use 
of evidence in the design of aid. As such, it contributes to the 
discussion about why donors and/or recipients prefer certain forms 
of support. Another question coming out of the study is how donors 
should work to strengthen the legitimacy of effective aid modalities 
that for some reason is difficult to communicate or explain for 
people outside the aid “industry”.  
It is my hope that this report will find its intended audience 
among a broad public interested in aid effectiveness, learning and 
evidence in development cooperation.  
The author’s work has been conducted in dialogue with a 
reference group chaired by Torgny Holmgren, member of the EBA. 
However, the author is solely responsible for the content of the 
report. 
 
Gothenburg, August 2018  
  
Helena Lindholm  
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Sammanfattning 
Budgetstöd är bistånd som inte är kopplat till projekt och som 
mottagarlandets regering kan använda fritt. Biståndet åtföljs oftast 
av en policydialog. Under de senaste åren har budgetstödens 
volymer minskat. I den här rapporten undersöks i vilken 
utsträckning det minskade intresset beror på bristande effektivitet. 
Rapporten innehåller en sammanfattning av tillgänglig kunskap om 
instrumentets effektivitet.  
Rapporten utgår från en policyteori om förväntade effekter 
utifrån budgetstödens insatta resurser: finansiering samt 
policydialog eller försök att utöva inflytande. Detta är en ”anpassad” 
policyteori. I rapporten hävdas att den ursprungliga policyteorin 
som betonade mottagarlandets ägarskap och fokuserade på ett mål, 
fattigdomsminskning, efterhand har ersatts av en ny policyteori där 
bidragsgivarna har återinfört olika policyvillkor och där dessa villkor 
alltmer är inriktade på politisk styrning. Att förbättra den politiska 
styrningen har blivit ett andra mål för budgetstödet. I rapporten följs 
resultaten av resurser och policydialog i en orsakskedja från 
harmonisering, anpassning och förutsägbarhet via kortsiktiga 
prestationer som stärkta lokala system, lägre transaktionskostnader, 
ökad makroekonomisk stabilitet samt ökade resurser till prioriterade 
sektorer, till effekter som förbättrad policy, styrning och 
fattigdomsminskning.  
De delfrågor som tas upp är: 
1. Hur ser de mellanliggande resultaten ut för det generella 
budgetstödet (aktiviteter och prestationer)? Uppnåddes 
förväntade prestationer? Varför eller varför inte? 
2. Ger policydialogen givarna inflytande över politik och 
styrning? Varför eller varför inte?   
3. På vilket sätt bidrar resurserna för budgetstöd – 
policydialog och finansiering – till förbättringar i fråga om 
sociala indikatorer och fattigdomsminskning utifrån 
möjligheterna till inflytande på regeringspolitik och via 
statens utgifter? 
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Metodmässigt utgår rapporten från IOB:s tidigare syntesstudie 
av budgetstöd (Dijkstra, De Kemp och Bergkamp, 2012). I den 
ingår en omfattande litteraturgenomgång, en systematisk jämförelse 
av sex nyligen utvärderade fall samt ekonometrisk forskning från 
flera länder om budgetstödets effekter. I den här rapporten 
presenteras också resultat från senare akademiska studier och 
utvärderingar av budgetstöd. I alla nyligen genomförda 
landutvärderingar ingår kvantitativa analyser av hur det slutliga 
utfallet har påverkats av budgetstödet, i synnerhet för utvalda sociala 
indikatorer. Detta bidrar till mer robusta svar på delfråga 3. 
Mellanliggande resultat 
I genomsnitt utgjorde budgetstöd mellan 14 och 28 procent av det 
totala offentliga utvecklingsbiståndet i de nyligen utvärderade 
länderna. Detta ledde till en betydande anpassning av biståndet till 
lokala system. Även om vissa givare fortsatte med separata variabla 
utbetalningar, harmoniserades utbetalningsvillkoren i de flesta 
länder. Förutsägbarheten från år till år för budgetstödet var bra, och 
bättre än för projektstöd. Förutsägbarheten inom ett enskilt år 
förblev till viss del problematisk. Utbetalningarna genomfördes 
senare än utlovat och den största delen av flödet inträffade mot 
slutet av året. Budgetstödet har inneburit minskade 
transaktionskostnader. Dessa positiva resultat gällde dock främst för 
utvärderingsperiodernas tidigare delar.1 Fördelarna gick mångt och 
mycket förlorade som en följd av mer intensivt fokus på 
samhällsstyrning, reaktioner på upplevda överträdelser av 
underliggande principer i budgetsstödsprocessen och generellt lägre 
budgetstödvolymer.  
Bidragsgivarna tillämpade inledningsvis viss selektivitet i 
budgetstödet, i synnerhet avseende styrning. Bidragsgivarna hade 
dock ofta svårt att respektera ägarskapet. När budgetstödet hade 
inletts använde de policydialogen för att påverka policyer och, i allt 
högre grad, styrningen. Denna brist på respekt för ägarskapet tycks 
                                                 
1 Brytpunkten varierar mellan olika länder men ligger någonstans mellan 2005 
(Uganda och Etiopien) och 2011 (Burkina Faso). 
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ha ökat över tiden. I många länder försämrades policydialogen till 
följd av en ond cirkel; ett ökande missnöje bland givarna med 
landets utvecklingsresultat, ofta rörande styrning, vilket ledde till 
ännu högre ambitioner i policydialogen, vilket i sin tur orsakade ett 
ännu större missnöje. Det ledde slutligen till tillbakadraget stöd. 
Detta minskade harmoniseringen då respektive givarland tog egna 
beslut i dessa frågor. Styrningsfrågans dominans har inte bara gjort 
frågan om ägarskap svår, den påverkar även andra fördelar med 
budgetstöd, såsom harmonisering, anpassning till lokala system och 
förutsägbarhet.  
Effekter på policy och styrning 
När givarna lyckades samordna sina preferenser för policydialogen 
och gemensamt enades om ett litet antal indikatorer, möjliggjorde 
det positiva övergripande effekter i dialogen utifrån bättre 
samordning och mer resultatinriktade nationella policyer. 
Kombinationen av nationella system, en omsorgsfull policydialog 
och teknisk assistans ledde till förbättringar i den offentliga 
finansiella styrningen i samarbetsländerna. Budgetstödets 
övergripande effekter vad gäller ett förbättrat nationellt 
ansvarsutkrävande tycks dock vara begränsade. Policydialogen sker 
mellan givare och mottagarlandets regering, och att lokala system 
och budgetar används medför inte automatiskt intresse i parlament 
eller bland civilsamhällesaktörer. Policydialogen och de åtföljande 
aktiviteterna för kapacitetsuppbyggnad ledde dock till institutionella 
förbättringar för ett horisontellt ansvarsutkrävande (på 
utbudssidan). De bidrog till ökad insyn i budgetar och i 
budgetgenomförandet, i synnerhet genom att stärka 
parlamentsutskott för offentliga räkenskaper, revisionsmyndigheter 
och nationell revisionsrätt. Det direkta stödet från givarna till 
institutioner på efterfrågesidan av ansvarsutkrävandet var mer 
begränsat. I flera länders har dock parlament, media och 
civilsamhället tagit tillvara de ökade möjligheterna att ställa 
regeringar till svars, vilket tyder på att budgetstöd till viss del även 
har bidragit till ett förbättrat vertikalt ansvarsutkrävande. 
Budgetstödet bidrog inte endast till att stärka institutionerna för 
tillsyn av budgetgenomförandet, utan även institutioner med uppgift 
att övervaka korruption. Detta bidrog till att fler fall av korruption 
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upptäcktes. I de flesta länderna finns dock fortfarande en oro för i 
vilken omfattning gärningsmännen lagförs och bestraffas. 
Tvärtemot mångas farhågor, saknas belägg för att budgetstöd har 
bidragit till en ökad korruption.  
Givarnas försök att påverka policy, styrning och mänskliga 
rättigheter har endast varit begränsat effektiva, något som ligger i 
linje med litteraturen om de tidigare så kallade 
strukturanpassningsprogrammen. Utvärderingarna pekar också på 
vissa förlorade möjligheter vad gäller policy. Givarna fokuserade 
ofta på för många enskilda resultatindikatorer. Detta skedde på 
bekostnad av en mer strategisk diskussion om att undanröja hinder 
i befintlig samhällsservice eller främja ekonomisk tillväxt. Givarna 
begränsades även av bristande kunskaper om hur budgetstöd eller 
regeringspolicyer skulle kunnat minska inkomstfattigdomen. 
Givarna var inte heller framgångsrika när de försökte skapa mer 
fattigdomsfokuserade policyer i områden där detta stred mot 
mottagarlandets regerings (upplevda) strategiska eller politiska 
intresse (Moçambique, Zambia). I fråga om samhällsstyrning och 
mänskliga rättigheter är det tydligt att hårda incitament, som hot om 
budgetstödsindragningar, i bästa fall lett till kosmetisk förändring. 
Mjuka incitament förefaller ha fungerat bättre. Vissa författare 
hävdar att givare skulle kunnat åstadkomma mer inom 
samhällsstyrningen om de agerade gemensamt, men det saknas 
tydliga belägg för denna tes.  
Budgetstöd har bidragit till att uppnå eller, beroende på 
situationen i mottagarlandet, upprätthålla den makroekonomiska 
stabiliteten. Budgetstöd har gett länder en möjlighet att öka de 
offentliga utgifterna utan att det påverkar den makroekonomiska 
stabiliteten och därmed har stöden bidragit till ekonomisk tillväxt. I 
de flesta länderna ökade utgifterna för prioriterade sektorer. Överlag 
saknas också belägg för att budgetstöd minskar de nationella 
skatteintäkterna. Det förekommer dock stora skillnader mellan 
länder, och oroande tendenser i detta avseende förekommer i vissa 
nyligen utvärderade länder (Burundi, Sierra Leone och Uganda). 
     
 
7 
Effekter på fattigdomsminskning 
Länder med budgetstöd har minskat inkomstfattigdomen mer än 
andra utvecklingsländer, men det är samtidigt inget bevis för en 
kausal relation. Från landutvärderingar kan man dock dra slutsatsen 
att om budgetstödet har bidragit till att minska inkomstfattigdomen 
skedde det med största sannolikt genom dess effekt på den 
ekonomiska tillväxten. Tillväxt har samtidigt inte varit en tillräcklig 
faktor för att minska inkomstfattigdomen. Det framgår av 
erfarenheten från Burkina Faso, Moçambique, Tanzania och 
Zambia där inkomstfattigdomen knappast minskat. 
Budgetstödet bidrog dock till att minska den icke 
inkomstbaserade fattigdomen. Budgetstödresurser, och ibland även 
dialog, har möjliggjort ökade utgifter i prioriterade sektorer. Detta 
har lett till fler klassrum, bättre läkemedelstillgänglighet och mer 
personal inom utbildning och hälsa. Det har i sin tur bidragit till att 
fler går i skolan, ökad jämlikhet vad gäller tillgång till 
grundskoleutbildning, bättre tillgång till hälsovård och bättre tillgång 
till vatten och sanitet. I vissa länder förbättrades tillgången till 
gymnasial utbildning avsevärt. I många länder såg man även 
resultatförbättringar vad gäller andelen elever som slutförde 
grundskolan, immuniseringsnivåer och nivåer för 
spädbarnsdödlighet och mödradödlighet. Att budgetstödet har 
bidragit till detta har visat sig både i kvantitativa landövergripande 
analyser och i fallstudier. I senare landsutvärderingar har man 
tillämpat mycket rigorösa metoder för att fastställa orsakssamband 
mellan de ökade investeringar som möjliggjorts genom budgetstödet 
och de slutliga sociala effekterna. 
Diskussion 
Sammantaget är det tydligt att de minskade volymerna av 
budgetstöd inte kan motiveras utifrån att instrumentet inte är 
effektivt eller utifrån att farhågor om korruption har besannats. 
Budgetstöd har tvärtom varit ett mycket effektivt sätt att minska, 
särskilt den icke inkomstbaserade fattigdomen, och det har även 
bidragit till förbättringar inom offentlig finansiell styrning och tillsyn 
av samhällsinstitutioner. 
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Samtidigt har budgetstöd inte varit en framgångsrik metod för 
att uppnå det andra, och senare tillagda, målet om att förändra 
mottagarländernas politiska styrning. Det finns istället belägg för en 
trade-off mellan målen. En prioritering av det andra policy-målet i 
kombination med nedslående resultat (inom det tillagda målet) ledde 
till att många biståndsgivare, särskilt bilaterala givare, tillfälligt 
upphävde och återkallade budgetstöd. Det, i sin tur, ledde till en 
mindre förutsägbar finansiering och lägre budgetsstödsvolymer, 
vilket minskade budgetstödets effekt på fattigdomsminskningen. 
Detta bekräftar regeln att ett instrument endast kan och bör ha ett 
mål (den så kallade Tinbergenregeln). Och för budgetstöd bör detta 
enda mål vara det ursprungliga målet om fattigdomsminskning.  
Framväxten av ett mål om att främja den politiska styrningen 
berodde på flera faktorer. För det första fanns det i början av 2000-
talet underliggande tvivel inom givarsamfundet om 
biståndseffektivitetsagendan. Trots den officiella betoningen på 
mottagarländernas ägarskap ansåg många givare att det krävdes fler 
villkor inom policy och styrning för att förbättra biståndets 
effektivitet. Budgetstöd tillsammans med åtföljande policydialog 
blev det ideala forumet för att genomföra dessa villkor. För det 
andra, och i motsats till den ursprungliga policyteorin, tillämpade 
givarna endast begränsad selektivitet i beslut om budgetstöd. För 
det tredje spelade utvecklingen inom givarländerna en roll i 
utvecklingen mot att ge den politiska styrningen en ökad 
uppmärksamhet, dvs. fokus på demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter, 
och även i den resulterande nedgången för instrumentet. En sådan 
faktor är 2008 års ekonomiska kris som medförde att medborgarna 
i allmänhet blev mer kritiska till utvecklingssamarbete. Detta 
förstärkte de upplevda riskerna med budgetstöd. Det ledde även till 
att regeringar kände sig tvungna att visa på mer konkreta resultat av 
biståndet. Detta är problematiskt när det gäller budgetstöd eftersom 
resultat är svåra att hänföra till enskilda givares insatser. En annan 
faktor är att konservativa regeringar fick en mer framträdande roll i 
många givarländer. Dessa regeringar är i allmänhet något mindre 
dedikerade till biståndseffektivitetsagendan.  
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Policyrekommendationer 
Med tanke på beläggen för att budgetstöd är effektivt i fråga om 
fattigdomsminskning så är frågan hur givare kan bygga vidare på de 
positiva resultaten och samtidigt beakta det politiska bakslaget för 
budgetstöd i de egna länderna. Givarna bör i grunden följa den 
ursprungliga policyteorin, vilket innebär en selektivitet i 
fördelningsbeslut för budgetstöd, en policydialog inriktad på 
fattigdomsminskning eller andra mål för hållbar utveckling, respekt 
för ägarskapet och en förutsägbar finansiering.   
Innan bistånd, inte bara budgetstöd, fördelas till en regering i ett 
mottagarland bör givaren ha visst förtroende för landets respekt för 
demokratiska värderingar och mänskliga rättigheter. 2 I synnerhet 
vad gäller budgetstöd är det viktigt med en viss tillit till system för 
budgetering och ansvarsutkrävande i förhållande till de offentliga 
finanserna, men en vilja till förbättring är viktigare än den faktiska 
nivån. Ett viktigt villkor för budgetstöd är också ett mått av 
förtroende för mottagarlandets socio-ekonomiska policy. 
Mot bakgrund av dessa kvalificerande villkor kan givare överväga 
en portfölj av olika biståndsformer. Om givarna saknar förtroende 
för den mottagande regeringens respekt för demokratiska värden 
och mänskliga rättigheter kan de överväga att ge bistånd till icke-
statliga organisationer eller att inte ge landet bistånd alls. Vid ett 
beslut att ge bistånd till en regering är ett generellt budgetstöd eller 
ett sektorbudgetstöd i princip mer effektivt än projektstöd för de 
flesta målsättningar i biståndet. I båda fallen kan medlen användas 
fritt, men innehållet i policydialogen ser olika ut. Ett generellt 
budgetstöd är mer lämpligt för att hantera strategiska och 
övergripande frågor som är relaterade till fattigdomsminskning, eller 
för att uppnå de hållbara utvecklingsmålen. Ett sektorbudgetstöd 
kan inriktas mer i detalj på policy för en viss sektor, ett visst, eller en 
uppsättning, mål för hållbar utveckling. 
Även på mottagarsidan kan man använda sig av en portfölj. Det 
är inte nödvändigt att ”alla” givare ingår i ett generellt budgetstöd. 
                                                 
2 Detta behöver inte gälla i så kallade fragila stater, men de ingår inte i denna 
rapport. 
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Mindre givargrupper har visat sig ge färre indragningar och en 
policydialog av högre kvalitet. Med tanke på att multilaterala givare 
i mindre grad påverkas av politik än bilaterala givare kan det vara 
klokt att ta emot generellt budgetstöd från (primärt) multilaterala 
givare, och samtidigt ta emot sektorbudgetstöd från olika mindre 
grupper bestående av (främst) bilaterala givare. Det skulle innebära 
att båda policydialogerna kan fokusera på utvecklingspolicy i stället 
för politik. Om det generella budgetstödet i delar ersattes med ett 
sektorbudgetstöd skulle det visserligen innebära en lägre 
harmonisering bland givare på central styrningsnivå, men medlen 
skulle fortfarande gå genom de inhemska systemen och 
förutsägbarheten för biståndet skulle sannolikt öka. 
Givare bör undvika att använda budgetstöd som en hävstång för 
att förbättra det politiska styret eller minska korruptionen. Det finns 
belägg för att sådana försök, t.ex. genom mål i så kallade 
Performance Assessment matriser, endast får formell eller 
symbolisk effekt. Frekventa (hot om) indragningar baserade på 
styrningen begränsar också de positiva effekterna av budgetstöd. 
Rekommendationen att inte använda budgetstöd för att påverka 
politisk styrning innebär inte att givarna inte bör ta upp 
styrningsfrågor med mottagande regeringar. Men en sådan dialog 
om demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter bör föras separat från 
dialogen om budgetstöd. 
Både det generella budgetstödet och sektorbudgetstödet sker 
inom de statliga budgeterings- och rapporteringssystemen så dessa 
instrument kan användas för att förbättra den offentliga finansiella 
styrningen och ansvarsutkrävandet vid nationella institutioner. 
Kombinationen av en policydialog och kompletterande tekniskt 
bistånd har visat sig vara effektivt, i synnerhet vad gäller den 
offentliga finansiella styrningen och institutioner inom horisontellt 
ansvarsutkrävande, t.ex. revisionsmyndigheten. Som ett 
komplement till budgetstödet bör givarna överväga att stödja 
institutioner för ansvarsutkrävande på efterfrågesidan, t.ex. genom 
parlament och civilsamhälle. Givare rekommenderas också att 
använda andra mjuka incitament som att främja deltagande i 
internationella nätverk. 
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Budgetstöddialogen kan även vara inriktad på policyer för 
minskning av (inkomst)fattigdomen eller för att främja 
genomförandet av agenda 2030. Men förväntningarna bör inte vara 
för höga vad gäller hur mycket budgetstöd kan bidra till att minska 
inkomstfattigdomen. Budgetstödresurser kan möjligen indirekt bidra 
till att minska inkomstfattigdomen genom en växande fysisk eller 
social infrastruktur för de fattiga. Ett direkt bidrag är endast möjligt 
om resurserna bidrar till att finansiera kontantstödsprogram. Utöver 
detta beror minskad inkomstfattigdom och ojämlikhet mer på 
regeringspolitik och inte på resurser. Biståndsgivarna kan bidra till 
att uppmärksamma en minskning av inkomstfattigdomen och 
ojämlikheten i policydialogen och även rekommendera och 
finansiera landspecifika studier om hur den offentliga politiken kan 
göra mer för de fattiga. 
Policydialogen vid generellt budgetstöd eller sektorbudgetstöd 
bör vara baserad på mottagarlandets ägarskap, vilket underförstått 
innebär ett begränsat antal PAF-indikatorer. Ju mer de deltagande 
givarna lyckas harmonisera utbetalningskriterierna, säkerställa en 
förutsägbar finansiering och respektera ägarskapet, desto effektivare 
kommer det generella budgetstödet och sektorbudgetstödet att vara. 
Behovet av att säkerställa en förutsägbar finansiering innebär att 
utbetalningarna inte bör ske genom så kallade ”variable tranches”. 
Det finns inga forskningsbelägg för en bättre överensstämmelse 
med indikatorerna vid dessa variabla villkorade utbetalningar än för 
indikatorer relaterade till mer fasta utbetalningar, och kvaliteten på 
policydialogen höjs om man undviker dessa.  
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Summary 
Budget support is an aid instrument that is not linked to projects 
and that is freely spendable by recipient governments. It is usually 
accompanied by a policy dialogue. Budget support volumes have 
declined in recent years. This report examines the extent to which 
this reduced interest is due to a lack of budget support effectiveness. 
It summarises the evidence available on the effectiveness of this aid 
instrument. 
The report starts from a policy theory on the expected effects of 
the two inputs of budget support, resources and policy dialogue or 
attempt to influence. This is an ‘adjusted’ policy theory. It is argued 
that the original policy theory, which stressed recipient country 
ownership and focused on one objective, namely poverty reduction, 
has been substituted by a new policy theory in which donors have 
reintroduced policy conditionality and in which this conditionality 
is increasingly focused on political governance. Improving 
governance has thus become a second objective of budget support. 
The report traces the effects of the two inputs of budget support 
along the causal chain – from throughputs such as harmonisation, 
alignment and predictability via outputs such as strengthened local 
systems, reduced transaction costs, improved macroeconomic 
stabilisation and more resources to priority sectors – to outcomes 
and impact such as improved policies and governance, and greater 
poverty reduction.  
The sub-questions the report addresses are: 
1. What are the intermediate effects (throughput and outputs) of 
general budget support? Did the expected outputs come about? 
Why or why not? 
2. Do donors have any influence on policies and governance 
through the policy dialogue? Why or why not?   
3. What is the contribution of the two budget support inputs, 
policy dialogue and resources, through their influence on 
government policies and spending, to improvements in social 
indicators and to poverty reduction? 
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Methodologically, the report takes the results of the IOB policy 
review of budget support (Dijkstra, De Kemp and Bergkamp, 2012) 
as starting point. This policy review includes an extensive literature 
review, a systematic comparison of six recently evaluated cases and 
cross-country econometric research on the effects of budget 
support. The current report additionally analyses the results 
presented in more recent academic studies and evaluations of 
budget support. All recent country evaluations include quantitative 
analyses of the effects of budget support-induced government 
policies on ultimate outcomes, and on selected social indictors in 
particular. This helps to provide a more robust answer to sub-
question 3. 
Intermediate effects 
On average, budget support constituted between 14 and 28 per cent 
of total ODA in the recently evaluated countries. This led to 
substantial alignment of aid to local systems. Although some donors 
maintained separate variable tranches, in most countries 
disbursement conditions were harmonised to a great extent. The 
between-year predictability of budget support was good, and better 
than for project aid. Within-year predictability remained somewhat 
problematic, with donors disbursing later than promised and most 
flows coming at the end of the year. Budget support decreased 
transaction costs. However, each of these positive findings held true 
mostly for the earlier parts of the evaluation periods.3 These benefits 
largely evaporated by the end of the period as a result of more 
intensive governance discussions, varying donor responses to 
perceived breaks with the underlying principles, and lower budget 
support volumes.  
Donors applied limited selectivity when starting budget support, in 
particular with respect to governance. And donors had difficulties 
in respecting ownership. Once budget support started, they began 
to use the policy dialogue to influence policies and, increasingly, 
governance. This lack of respect for ownership seemed to increase 
over time. In many countries, the policy dialogue deteriorated as a 
                                                 
3 The turning point varies between the countries but lies somewhere between 
2005 (Uganda and Ethiopia) and 2011 (Burkina Faso). 
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result of a vicious circle: increasing donor dissatisfaction with 
country performance, often on governance issues, led to ever higher 
policy dialogue ambitions, in turn causing more dissatisfaction. In 
the end, this led to budget support suspensions and withdrawals, 
with each donor country making its own decisions on these matters, 
thus reducing harmonisation. The dominance of the governance 
objective was detrimental to ownership, and it also affected the 
other benefits of budget support, namely harmonisation, alignment 
and predictability. 
Effects on policy and governance 
If donors succeeded in coordinating their policy dialogue 
preferences and jointly agreed on a small number of Performance 
Assessment Framework (PAF) indicators, positive systemic effects 
of the dialogue were possible for better coordination and higher 
results-orientation of national policies. The combination of the use 
of domestic systems, attention in the policy dialogue and technical 
assistance led to improvements in Public Financial Management. 
The systemic effects of budget support on increasing domestic 
accountability seemed to be limited. The policy dialogue is between 
donors and recipient government, and the use of local systems and 
budgets did not automatically generate interest in parliament or 
among civil society actors. Yet, the policy dialogue and 
accompanying capacity-building activities did lead to improvements 
in the institutions for horizontal accountability (the supply side). It 
contributed to increasing budget transparency and budget 
execution, particularly through strengthening Public Accounts 
Committees of Parliaments, Supreme Audit Institutions or Courts 
of Audit. Direct donor support to institutions on the demand side 
of accountability was more limited. Yet in several countries, 
parliaments, media and/or civil society had seized the increased 
opportunities to hold governments to account, implying that budget 
support also contributed somewhat to improvements in vertical 
accountability. Budget support strengthened not only institutions 
for the oversight of budget execution, but also other institutions 
aiming to monitor corruption. This helped detect more corruption 
cases. However, in most countries concerns remain about the extent 
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of prosecution and punishment of the culprits. Contrary to the 
many expectations on the high fiduciary risks of budget support, 
there is no evidence that it increased corruption.  
In line with earlier literature on structural adjustment, the 
effectiveness of donor attempts to influence policies, governance 
and human rights was limited. With respect to policies, the 
evaluations point to some missed opportunities. Donors often 
focused too much on too many individual performance indicators 
at the expense of a more strategic discussion on how to remove 
obstacles to public service provision or foster economic growth. 
Donors were also hindered by a lack of knowledge about how 
budget support or government policies could reduce income 
poverty. However, when donors tried to make policies more pro-
poor in situations where this conflicted with (perceived) strategic or 
political interest of the recipient government (Mozambique, 
Zambia), they were not successful. Regarding governance and 
human rights, it was clear that hard incentives, such as indicators in 
the PAF or (threats of) suspensions, led at most to cosmetic 
changes. Soft incentives appeared to be more effective. Although 
some authors argue that donors would achieve more in the 
governance area if they could speak with one voice, the evidence for 
this is not strong. 
Budget support has contributed to achieving or, depending on 
the situation in the recipient country, maintaining macroeconomic 
stability. Budget support allowed countries to increase government 
expenditure without affecting macroeconomic stability, thus 
contributing to economic growth. In most countries, spending for 
the priority sectors, as defined in the Poverty Reduction Strategies, 
increased. On average, there is no evidence that budget support 
reduced domestic tax revenues. However, there are large differences 
between countries, with worrying trends in some recently evaluated 
countries (Burundi, Sierra Leone and Uganda). 
Effects on poverty reduction 
Countries receiving budget support have experienced more 
reduction in income poverty than other developing countries, but 
this does not prove a causal relationship. From the country 
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evaluations, it can be concluded that if budget support contributed 
to a reduction of income poverty, it was most likely through its 
effect on economic growth. However, growth by no means proved 
a sufficient condition for reducing income poverty, as shown by the 
experiences of Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, 
where income poverty hardly decreased. 
Budget support did contribute to the reduction of non-income 
poverty. Budget support resources, and sometimes the dialogue as 
well, have facilitated increased expenditure for priority sectors. This 
has led to more classrooms, more drug availability, and more staff 
in education and health care. This in turn has contributed to higher 
school enrolment rates, more gender equality in access to primary 
education, greater access to health services and greater access to 
water and sanitation. In some countries, access to secondary 
education significantly improved as well. Many countries also 
experienced improvements in outcomes such as primary school 
completion rates, immunisation rates, infant and child mortality 
rates, and maternal mortality rates. The contribution of budget 
support to these achievements has been shown in both quantitative 
cross-country analyses and case studies, with the more recent 
country evaluations applying rigorous methods for establishing the 
causal relationship between increased investment facilitated by 
budget support and ultimate social outcomes. 
Discussion 
All in all, it is clear that the decrease in budget support volumes 
cannot be justified by a lack of effectiveness of the instrument, or 
by materialisation of the – assumed – fiduciary risks. On the 
contrary, budget support has been very effective at reducing 
poverty, particularly non-income poverty, and has also contributed 
to improvements in public financial management and in oversight 
institutions. 
At the same time, budget support has not been able to achieve 
the second objective (added later) of improving political governance 
in recipient countries. Evidence points to a trade-off between the 
two objectives. The prioritisation of the second objective and the 
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disappointing results in this area have led many donors, especially 
bilateral donors, to suspend or withdraw their budget support. This 
in turn has led to less predictable funding and lower budget support 
volumes, thus reducing the effectiveness of budget support in 
poverty reduction. This confirms that each policy instrument should 
have only one objective (the Tinbergen rule). For budget support, 
this single objective should clearly be the original one of poverty 
reduction.  
The coming to the fore of the objective of promoting political 
governance was the result of several factors. Firstly, there were 
latent doubts in the donor community on the aid effectiveness 
agenda of the early 2000s. Despite the official emphasis on 
ownership by recipient countries, many donors were (also) of the 
view that additional policy and governance conditions were required 
to improve aid effectiveness. Budget support, with its accompanying 
policy dialogue, became the ideal forum for implementing this 
conditionality. Secondly, and contrary to the original policy theory, 
donors applied limited selectivity in the allocation decision for 
budget support. Thirdly, several factors within donor countries 
played a role in the increasing attention paid to political governance, 
i.e. democracy and human rights concerns, and in the resulting 
demise of the instrument. One such factor was the economic crisis 
of 2008 that caused citizens to be more critical of development 
cooperation in general. This reinforced the perceived fiduciary and 
other risks of budget support. It also resulted in the need for 
governments to be able to show visible results of aid. This is more 
difficult with budget support, as the results cannot easily be 
attributed to the efforts of individual donors. Another factor was 
the rise of more conservative governments in many donor countries. 
Such governments are generally less committed to the aid 
effectiveness agenda.  
Policy recommendations 
Given the evidence of the effectiveness of budget support for 
poverty reduction, the question is how donors can build on the 
positive outcomes of budget support, while taking account of the 
political backlash of budget support within their own countries. 
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Basically, donors should adhere to the original policy theory, 
meaning that they should apply some selectivity in their budget 
support allocation decision, focus the policy dialogue on poverty 
reduction or other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), respect 
ownership and secure predictable funding.   
Before providing aid – not just budget support – to the 
government of a recipient country, donors should have some 
confidence in that government’s respect for democratic values and 
human rights.4 For budget support, in particular, some confidence 
in budgeting and public financial accountability systems is 
important, although a willingness to improve is more important 
than the actual level. Finally, an important condition for budget 
support is a certain level of confidence in the recipient country’s 
socio-economic policies. 
In view of these eligibility conditions, donors may consider a 
portfolio approach of different aid modalities. If donors do not have 
trust in the recipient government’s respect for democratic values 
and human rights, they may consider providing aid to non-
governmental organisations or not providing aid to the country at 
all. In case donors decide to allocate aid to governments, general or 
sector budget support is in principle more effective than project aid 
for most aid objectives. In both aid instruments the resources are 
freely spendable but the content of the policy dialogue is different. 
General budget support is more suitable for dealing with strategic 
and cross-cutting issues related to poverty reduction or for 
achieving other SDGs. Sector budget support focuses more 
specifically on policies for a particular sector or on a particular (set 
of) SDG(s). 
In a way, recipient countries can also apply a portfolio approach. 
It is not necessary that “all” donors participate in general budget 
support. Having smaller donor groups has proven to be associated 
with fewer suspensions and with a better-quality policy dialogue. 
Given that multilateral donors are less influenced by political 
concerns than bilateral donors, it may be sensible to receive general 
                                                 
4 This does not need to apply in fragile states, but fragile states are not included 
in this report. 
       
20 
budget support from (mainly) multilateral donors, while receiving 
sector budget support from different groups of (mainly) bilateral 
donors. This would mean that the policy dialogues can focus on 
policies instead of on politics and governance. And although the 
partial substitution of general budget support with sector budget 
support would imply less donor harmonisation at the central 
government level, resources would still be aligned to government 
systems and aid predictability would probably increase. 
Donors should refrain from using budget support as leverage for 
improving political governance or reducing corruption. Evidence 
shows that these attempts, for example through the use of targets in 
the Performance Assessment Matrix, have at most had formal or 
symbolic effects. On the other hand, frequent (threats of) 
suspensions for governance reasons hamper the advantages of 
budget support. The recommendation not to use budget support as 
leverage for influencing governance does not mean that donors 
should not raise their governance concerns with a recipient 
government. But such a dialogue on democracy and human rights 
issues should be held separately from the dialogue on budget 
support. 
Both general and sector budget support use government 
budgeting and reporting systems, so these instruments can be used 
for improving Public Financial Management (PFM) and domestic 
accountability institutions. The combination of policy dialogue and 
accompanying technical assistance has proven to be effective, 
particularly for PFM and horizontal accountability institutions such 
as Supreme Audit Institutions. As complementary measures to 
budget support, donors should also consider supporting institutions 
for vertical accountability (the demand side), such as parliament and 
civil society. Donors are recommended to use other soft incentives 
as well, such as promoting participation in international networks. 
The budget support dialogue can also focus on (income) poverty 
reduction policies or on policies to foster achievement of the SDGs. 
But expectations of budget support contributing to the reduction of 
income poverty should be tempered. Budget support resources can 
indirectly contribute to income poverty reduction through 
expanding physical or social infrastructure for the poor. A direct 
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contribution is only possible if resources help finance social safety 
net programmes. Beyond this, the reduction of income poverty and 
inequality depends more on government policies than, on resources. 
Donors can call attention to the reduction of income poverty and 
inequality in the policy dialogue, and may recommend and finance 
country-specific studies on how public policies can be made more 
pro-poor. 
The policy dialogue around general or sector budget support 
should be based on ownership by the recipient country, implying 
that the number of indicators in the PAF should be limited. The 
more participating donors succeed in harmonising disbursement 
criteria, securing predictable funding, and respecting ownership, the 
more effective general and sector budget support will be. The need 
to secure predictable funding also means that the use of variable 
disbursement tranches should be avoided. There is no evidence of 
better compliance with indicators for variable tranches than for 
fixed tranches, and avoiding variable tranches will improve the 
quality of the policy dialogue. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
This report aims to review the effectiveness of budget support. 
General Budget support or, for short, budget support is a form of 
programme aid, and is thus aid that is not linked to projects. The 
resources flow directly to the Ministry of Finance, but this aid 
instrument is usually accompanied by a policy dialogue in which 
donors discuss their preferred policies with the governments of 
recipient countries. Around the year 2000, budget support came to 
be seen as the more effective aid modality. On the one hand, this 
instrument was considered better than the earlier balance of 
payments support. The policy conditionality that had accompanied 
balance of payments support, for example on trade liberalisation and 
on privatisation of state-owned enterprises, had not been effective 
(World Bank, 1998). The provision of budget support would be 
based on Poverty Reduction Strategy papers developed by recipient 
countries themselves, so would be based on ownership. On the 
other hand, budget support was considered the best approach to 
meet the aid effectiveness objectives as defined in several High 
Level meetings of donors and recipient countries. It was expected 
to further ownership, alignment (with recipient governments’ 
strategies institutions and procedures), harmonisation and a results 
orientation - all considered important in the new aid approach. The 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (High Level Forum, 2005), 
for example, stipulated that by 2010, 66 percent of all aid had to be 
given in “programme-based approaches”. This includes General 
Budget Support (GBS), Sector Budget Support (SBS) and aid 
provided in Sector-Wide Approaches. This report focuses on GBS 
and SBS as both involve a non-earmarked flow of resources to the 
government.5   
                                                 
5 In Sector Budget Support the policy dialogue is focused on a particular sector. 
Aid in Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAPs) is earmarked to projects but given to 
support sector wide government plans. OECD aid statistics do not provide 
information on the amount of aid provided in SWAPs and only since 2009 on 
SBS flows.  
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Yet, the evaluation of the Paris Declaration (Wood et al., 2011) 
shows that although programme-based approaches increased, 
project aid remained dominant. According to OECD/DAC figures, 
the amount of GBS rose between 2003 and 2008, but decreased 
after that. In 2013 there was another temporary increase (the blue 
line in Figure 1). However, the total GBS flows have never become 
very large. The share of GBS in total Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) was again largest in 2008 and 2013 but it was only 
5 percent in those years (orange line in Figure 1). Yet, for particular 
recipient countries, the share of budget support in total aid was 
substantially higher. For example, between around 2005 and 2010, 
GBS amounted to 29 percent of total aid in Ghana, 30 percent in 
Zambia and 42 percent in Tanzania (Dijkstra, De Kemp and 
Bergkamp, 2012: 103).  
However, in recent years the volume of budget support provided 
by all donors has decreased (Figure 1). This has to some extent been 
compensated by an increase in sector budget support, but by no 
means fully. The trend in SBS cannot be shown as this modality has 
only been registered since 2009. Sweden has allocated a larger share 
of its aid to GBS than the average DAC donor (green line in Figure 
1). However, the share in total aid decreased sharply between 2008 
and 2014. In 2015, there was a slight recovery.  
This raises the question whether this decline in global GBS, and 
in Swedish GBS in particular, is related to the evidence on budget 
support’s effectiveness. This effectiveness has been highly contested 
from the start. Budget support is perceived as a “risky” instrument, 
because the resources can easily disappear in the pockets of corrupt 
officials. For this reason, many evaluations have been carried out, 
and the topic also received attention in the academic literature. This 
report aims to review the evidence from donor-commissioned 
country evaluations, from existing comparative (synthesis) studies 
of those country evaluations and from cross-country quantitative 
studies.     
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Figure 1. Trends in General Budget Support 2000-2015, in 
current US$ billions and in % 
 
Sources: OECD/DAC, CRS for total ODA and total GBS (commitments), and www.openaid.se 
for Swedish data (disbursements) 
It is, however, not the first review of the budget support evidence. 
Tavakoli & Smith (2013) have summarised the evidence from all the 
country evaluations carried out until 2011. A 2012 report of the 
Dutch Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) 
includes a comprehensive literature review of existing evidence, a 
comparative analysis of six country case studies, and econometric 
research to assess the impact of budget support (Dijkstra et al., 
2012). Ronsholt (2014) carried out a slightly more recent review of 
the evidence on budget support for the Danish International 
Development Cooperation (DANIDA). Finally, the German 
Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval) recently carried out 
a systematic review of the evidence on budget support, applying 
rigorous criteria for assessing the evidence (Orth et al., 2017). 
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This report uses all sources including previous reviews. In 
formulating the research questions and in answering them, it follows 
the intervention logic of budget support as outlined below and 
based on Dijkstra et al. (2012). Most recent evaluations of budget 
support as well as the Orth et al. (2017) review use a slightly different 
policy theory. Later in this chapter I discuss the similarities and 
differences with these other approaches, and justify the choices 
made in this report.  
1.2 The policy theory of budget support 
The benefits of the instrument are based on two properties that are 
the two inputs of this modality (Table 1). First, there is respect for 
ownership in the policy dialogue. This feature is supposed to 
distinguish budget support from the earlier balance of payments 
support that was accompanied by heavy conditionality, which often 
did not work (Collier et al., 1997; Dijkstra, 2002; Killick et al., 1998). 
Respect for ownership will bring better policy implementation than 
was the case with balance of payments support (output, middle 
column). 
However, this respect for ownership presupposes some 
selectivity in the budget support allocation decision. Donors can 
have respect for ownership only if they have a basic level of trust in 
recipient country’s policies (commitment to macro-economic 
stability and to poverty reduction), and perhaps also governance. 
The latter may include both the more technocratic aspects of 
governance, such as efficient, transparent and accountable public 
service delivery and absence of fiduciary risks, and the more political 
aspects, such as an elected legislative power, regular elections and 
respect for human rights (Leftwich, 1993). Different donors may 
have different views on the necessary governance conditions. In 
order to have this trust as the basis for ownership, donors must be 
selective in the choice of countries to which they provide budget 
support. 
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Table 1. Original policy theory for budget support  
Inputs Selectivity  Resources 
Through-
put 
Respect for 
ownership in 
the policy 
dialogue 
Alignment Harmonisation Predictability 
Outputs Improved policy 
implementation 
Strengthening local systems as a result of 
use  
Lower transaction costs 
More macro-economic stability 
More resources for poverty reducing 
sectors 
More democratic accountability 
Outcomes Enhanced government effectiveness 
Impact Greater poverty reduction 
Source: Dijkstra et al. (2012) 
The second input is that the resources can be freely spent by the 
recipient government. This would make budget support more 
effective than project aid.6 The fact that resources can be freely 
spent would lead to more alignment with government systems and 
to greater donor harmonisation – as compared to project aid. It was 
also expected that budget support would be more predictable than 
and less volatile than project aid. 
The use of local systems can be expected to lead to positive 
“systemic effects” (Nilsson, 2004; Schmitt, 2017; White & Dijkstra, 
2003) on local systems for planning, budgeting, implementation and 
monitoring (first output in the “resources” column). These systemic 
effects could well be reinforced by the policy dialogue, as it makes 
sense for budget support donors to focus the policy dialogue on an 
improvement of public financial management (PFM), in particular 
                                                 
6 An additional reason for preferring budget support above project aid is that 
project money may be fungible: if the government would implement the project 
anyway, it can spend the resources at will.  
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of transparency and accountability of budgeting and reporting 
systems (White and Dijkstra, 2003: 550). The alignment to national 
systems and the donor harmonisation would reduce transaction 
costs for both recipients and donors. Budget support resources 
would also increase macro-economic stability and/or lead to 
additional resources for the social sectors. Furthermore, the fact that 
resources enter national budgets would imply that their use can be 
discussed in parliament and this would foster national democratic 
accountability, the last line under “outputs” in the “resources” 
column in Table 1.  
The improved policy implementation and the additional 
resources that are now better spent would lead to enhanced 
government effectiveness in poverty reduction policies (outcome). 
In turn, this would lead to greater poverty reduction, both in terms 
of improved social indicators and in terms of reduced income 
poverty (impact).  
In practice, this original policy theory was hardly applied. 
Although all donors had agreed to the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness and thus had underlined the importance of 
“ownership” and the failures of conditionality, there was a certain 
amount of “schizophrenia” among the donor community. Many 
donor representatives were (also) of the opinion that conditionality 
in the earlier balance of payments support had not been enough and 
had to be strengthened (Renard, 2007; Rogerson, 2005). They saw 
budget support as an opportunity to continue to interfere with 
recipient countries’ policies. At the same time, and as discussed 
more extensively in chapter 2, donors applied only limited selectivity 
in the budget support allocation decisions. This limited selectivity 
implied that donors did not fully trust recipient countries’ policies 
and/or governance and it led to the return of conditionality in 
budget support (Knoll, 2008; Nilsson, 2004; Whitfield, 2009). 
In several respects, conditionality changed and expanded as 
compared with the earlier structural adjustment programmes linked 
to balance of payments support. First, while under structural 
adjustment the IMF and the World Bank were the main actors on 
the donor side, now all multilateral and bilateral donors obtained a 
seat on the policy dialogue table (Swedlund, 2013; Whitfield, 2009). 
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And second, the focus of conditionality expanded; it did not only 
include policies but increasingly also governance aspects. And this 
governance not only included technocratic elements, for example 
quality and transparency of budgets and budget implementation, but 
also political elements such as respect for democracy and human 
rights (Dijkstra, 2013; Hayman, 2011; Molenaers, Cepinskas, & 
Jacobs, 2010; Swedlund, 2013).  
All this leads to a slightly different intervention theory. Selectivity 
and respect for ownership in the policy dialogue cannot be taken for 
granted but must be investigated in evaluations. If both are limited, 
the policy dialogue accompanying budget support resembles the 
earlier conditionality and is more likely to be an “attempt to 
influence”. The donor input for this policy dialogue can then be 
called “preferences for the policy dialogue” (Table 2). As these 
preferences will not be the same for all donors, “donor 
harmonisation” becomes an issue for the policy dialogue as well. 
The reintroduction of donor attempts to influence also means that 
there may be an effect of the policy dialogue on most of the outputs 
listed in the “resources” column – in fact on all except the lower 
transaction costs. 
Another change is that budget support now has two objectives: 
not only poverty reduction, but also improved policies and 
governance. The policy dialogue became crucial in achieving these 
improved policies and governance. And while in the original policy 
theory improving governance was limited to the more technocratic 
aspects and in particular PFM, governance now also included the 
more political aspects. Most donors see improved governance, both 
technocratic and political governance, as a means towards achieving 
more economic growth and greater poverty reduction. For this 
reason, improved governance appears as both outcome and impact 
variable in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Actual policy theory on budget support 
In
pu
ts
 
Selectivity and/or 
preferences for the 
policy dialogue 
Resources 
Th
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ug
hp
ut
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n 
Respect for 
ownership or 
attempt to 
influence in 
policy 
dialogue Al
ig
nm
en
t 
H
ar
m
on
is
at
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n 
Pr
ed
ic
ta
bi
lit
y 
O
ut
pu
ts
 
Improved 
implementation of 
government policies, or 
of donor-desired 
changes in policy and 
governance, both 
technocratic and 
political governance 
Strengthening local systems as a 
result of use 
Lower transaction costs 
More macro-economic stability 
More resources for poverty 
reducing sectors 
More democratic accountability 
O
ut
co
m
es
 Enhanced government effectiveness; 
Improved policy and governance 
Im
pa
ct
 
Greater poverty reduction; 
Improved technocratic and political governance 
Source: Dijkstra et al. (2012). 
1.3 Main questions 
This leads to the following overall question and sub-questions for 
this report. The main research question is: What do we know about 
the effectiveness of budget support? The sub-questions are: 
1. What are the intermediate effects (throughput and outputs) of 
GBS? Did the expected outputs come about and why or why 
not? 
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2. Do donors have influence on policies and governance through 
the policy dialogue? Why or why not?   
3. What is the contribution of the two budget support inputs, 
policy dialogue and resources, through their influence on 
government policies and spending, to improvements in social 
indicators and to poverty reduction? 
Starting from the policy theory as depicted in Table 2, the study 
examines the existing evidence along all steps of the framework. 
This means that the two inputs of budget support are considered, 
resources and respect for ownership or attempt to influence, and 
that two ultimate objectives of GBS are taken into account: both the 
original objective of poverty reduction, and the added objective of 
improving policies and governance. By following the intervention 
theory and to the extent that existing sources allow, explanations are 
also provided in order to answer the questions when and how GBS 
is effective. 
Throughout this report, budget support will mainly be compared 
with project aid. Although the original policy theory had two 
counterfactuals, balance of payments support (for the policy 
dialogue) and project aid (for the resources channel), balance of 
payments support is hardly provided anymore. Yet it is important 
to investigate the degree of ownership and/or the extent of 
influence in the policy dialogue, because they also determine the 
degree of effectiveness of budget support as compared to project 
aid.  
1.4 Previous studies 
The approach taken here is very similar to that used in most other 
evaluations and studies of budget support. This is not surprising, 
since all are based on the original “Evaluability study” (Lawson, 
Booth, Harding, Hoole, & Naschold, 2002), which in turn is based 
on the framework developed by Howard White for programme aid 
(White, 1996). The earlier evaluations of budget support have all 
used variants of the evaluability framework (IDD and associates, 
2006; Lawson et al., 2005; Lawson et al., 2007).  
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More recent evaluations of budget support follow the 
Comprehensive Evaluation Framework (CEF) developed by the 
Budget Support Evaluation Steering Group of OECD DAC. A first 
version of this framework was piloted in budget support evaluations 
in Mali, Zambia, and Tunisia. After that, a final version was 
established (Van der Linde & Valmarana, 2012). Although it is a 
good evaluation framework, in my view the approach taken in this 
report is at least as valuable and in some respects possibly better. In 
what follows, I discuss the main differences.  
First, the CEF includes capacity building or technical assistance 
as a third input of budget support. Although budget support is 
“sometimes accompanied by capacity development”, as Van der 
Linde and Valmarana (2012: 6) formulate it themselves when they 
define budget support, it is clearly not a necessary element of budget 
support. In my view it should therefore not be part of the 
intervention logic. Nevertheless, where relevant, I discuss the effects 
of technical assistance or capacity building in this report. Second, 
the CEF includes improvements in governance as a possible result 
at impact level that may or may not be analysed, depending on the 
specific partnership frameworks. In my opinion improving 
governance, including the more political aspects of it, has become a 
too important objective of budget support and cannot be omitted 
from the analysis. Third, the result chain of the CEF is rather 
complex while in general I think it is good to pursue parsimony in 
sketching the basic relationships. Another advantage of the simple 
structure of Table 2 is that the two inputs for budget support have 
separate results chains.  
A fourth difference is that the CEF framework not only 
distinguishes between levels in the causality chain, but also between 
different steps in the analysis. While step 1 traces direct and induced 
effects of budget support, step 2 analyses the effects of government 
policies on expected outcomes and impact of budget support. The 
CEF framework recommends to apply quantitative analysis of 
specific government interventions to which budget support has 
contributed, by exploiting sectoral or geographical heterogeneity of 
government investments and using fixed effect regressions or 
difference-in-difference estimations. Step 3 then combines the 
results of steps 1 and 2 in order to identify the contribution of 
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budget support to development outcomes. This three-step 
approach rightly acknowledges that the results at, in particular, 
outcome and impact levels, may be influenced by many other 
factors, most notably by government policies. Step 2 allows for a 
separate analysis of these policies. Although my approach does not 
include this separate step 2, the intentions are the same. The effects 
of government (spending) policies are taken into account, and 
reported on, when answering subquestion 3. 
With respect to the levels in the causality chain of the CEF, the 
two approaches are similar. The “direct outputs” level in the CEF is 
equal to the “throughput” level of Table 2, while the “induced 
outputs”, the next level in the CEF, are similar to the “outputs” in 
Table 2. All in all, I think my approach is broadly similar  to that of 
the OECD and where it is different, it is simpler, more explicit about 
counterfactual(s) and more explicit about political governance as 
objective.  
The earlier reviews also have somewhat different approaches. 
Ronsholt (2014) only covers donor-commissioned evaluations and 
does not systematically follow a policy theory on budget support. 
Furthermore, his study does not include the most recent 
evaluations, for example those of Uganda, Burundi, Burkina Faso, 
Ghana and Sierra Leone. Orth et al. (2017) is very comprehensive, 
covering 95 sources. It is a systematic review with explicit criteria 
for assessing the quality of the evidence, differentiating between 
“best” and “second-best” evidence. However, it uses somewhat 
arbitrary criteria for drawing conclusions, such as that a finding is 
only considered reliable if supported by at least ten sources – no 
matter whether these are original evaluations, or academic 
literature/reviews using these sources. It is based on a policy theory, 
broadly following the CEF. It traces the effects of all budget support 
inputs. In so doing, it considers budget support to have four inputs. 
Like Van der Linde and Valdarama (2012), it includes capacity 
building as a third input next to “resources” and “policy dialogue”, 
but then adds “conditionality” as a fourth. However, it is not so 
clear how “policy dialogue” and “conditionality” are defined and 
why these are considered separate concepts.  
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1.5 Methodology and sources used 
This report is a literature review of the evidence of the effects of 
budget support. It examines the effects on the two ultimate 
objectives of general budget support, poverty reduction and 
governance. For both objectives, it traces the intermediate effects 
along the causal chain, following the intervention logic as sketched 
in Table 2. The review does not include separate studies of sector 
budget support, but most of the more recent evaluations of budget 
support include the effects of sector budget support. Given that in 
both cases the resources are transferred to the government, the 
effects, in particular of the resources, cannot be disentangled and 
will be taken on board in this report. 
Given that the author was involved in an extensive literature 
review on the evidence of budget support in 2011 and 2012 
(Dijkstra et al., 2012), and in order to keep the length of this report 
manageable, this report gives most attention to evaluations and 
studies that appeared after 2012, so between 2012 and 2017. The 
more recent literature includes evaluations, reviews and academic 
studies. The newer evaluations could be found on the website of the 
OECD/DAC. In order to find the academic literature, I searched 
the library of Erasmus University Rotterdam (connected with all 
academic libraries in the Netherlands) with “budget support” in 
keywords or title, and performed an additional search in the “Web 
of Science” database, again looking for “budget support” in the title. 
In addition, some additional academic sources were found by 
checking the references in the collected studies. 
The different sections in this report start by briefly summarizing 
the evidence presented in Dijkstra et al. (2012). This includes 
highlights from its literature review, from the qualitative evidence 
based on comparing six country evaluations (Ghana, Mali, Tanzania, 
Zambia, Nicaragua and Vietnam) and from the results from the 
econometric analyses included in that study. The conclusions of this 
earlier study are considered to be of high validity, precisely because 
of the combination of literature review, quantitative and qualitative 
evidence (Dijkstra and De Kemp, 2013). 
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The sections then discuss the evidence from the more recent 
evaluations and academic literature. These recent evaluations have 
all been commissioned by the European Commission (sometimes 
together with the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the 
World Bank). They use the CEF and have been subjected to 
extensive quality control through the presence of management 
teams in which many donor evaluation offices are represented, and 
reference groups. In general, I consider them to be of high and of 
roughly equal quality. All academic studies used have appeared in 
peer reviewed journals which guarantees their quality.  
In order to draw conclusions, I compare the evidence from 
Dijkstra et al. (2012) with that from the more recent country 
evaluations, also taking into account the conclusions from the more 
recent synthesis studies and reviews. For some topics, academic 
studies can add evidence and/or help explaining certain findings and 
developments. Before presenting something as a finding from a 
study, I double checked whether the authors present evidence for a 
link between budget support inputs and a certain result. The 
evaluations carried out since 2012 have all used econometric analysis 
for drawing conclusions on the effect of budget support on, in 
particular, poverty indicators. 
The focus in this report is on the effectiveness of budget support 
in low and lower middle income countries, thus excluding the 
evaluations of budget support in Morocco, Tunisia and South 
Africa.7 As Lawson et al. (2014) shows, budget support has very 
different effects in these countries with much lower aid dependence 
and much higher institutional capacities. And Lawson et al. (2014) 
provide a very good summary of the budget support evaluations in 
these three countries. 
The structure of this report is as follows. The sub-questions 1, 2 
and 3 are answered in chapters 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Chapter 5 
presents and discusses the main findings, and chapter 6 provides 
some policy recommendations.  
                                                 
7 In Morocco and South Africa, there was only sector budget support so these 
evaluations were already excluded for that reason. 
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Chapter 2. Intermediate effects of GBS 
This chapter assesses the intermediate effects of the two inputs of 
budget support, on the one hand the resources, and on the other 
hand the selectivity, or the preferences for the policy dialogue. It 
first looks at the throughput (Table 2), or the “direct outputs” (CEF) 
of budget support. For the resources these are alignment, 
harmonisation and predictability, and for the policy dialogue respect 
for ownership or attempt to influence, and also degree of 
harmonisation. Then the outputs (“induced outputs” in the CEF) 
are assessed, in particular for the resources channel (Table 2): lower 
transaction costs, macro-economic stability, and more resources for 
social sectors.  
As depicted in Table 2, the alignment to recipient government 
systems for planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation would strengthen these systems. In addition, an increase 
in on-budget aid improves transparency of development efforts and 
may improve government accountability towards parliament and 
civil society. Yet, next to these systemic effects there may be effects 
from the policy dialogue on these outputs. Hence, these topics are 
left for the next chapter.  
2.1 Throughput (1): Harmonisation, 
alignment, predictability 
The first question is whether and to what extent the throughputs 
harmonisation and alignment of budget support disbursements are 
achieved. Alignment is to a large extent determined by the volume 
of budget support relative to total aid, as budget support resources 
are channelled through national systems by definition. The extent 
of harmonisation depends on whether and to what extent donors 
use a joint assessment framework and harmonise their disbursement 
procedures. Dijkstra et al. (2012) concluded that only 31 countries 
(with more than 500,000 inhabitants) received a substantial amount 
of budget support, defined as at least 2.5 percent of total aid in the 
period 2002-2010.  However, in the six selected case studies (Ghana, 
Mali, Tanzania, Zambia, Nicaragua and Vietnam, general budget 
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support constituted between 10 (Vietnam) and 42 percent 
(Tanzania) of total aid. 
Table 3 adds data for the countries that have been evaluated 
more recently (again), starting with the four countries covered in 
Lawson’s synthesis (Lawson et al., 2014), and ending with the recent 
evaluations of budget support in post-conflict states Burundi and 
Sierra Leone, where the situation is a bit different. 
All in all, the extent of budget support and thus of alignment has 
been substantial in these countries. However, in almost all countries 
volumes of budget support have declined in recent years due to 
withdrawal of donors and lower amounts from those donors that 
continued. This has affected the annual averages negatively, 
particularly in Ghana where budget support dropped sharply after 
2011. The exception is Sierra Leone where budget support increased 
in the final year, mainly due to the Ebola crisis. But in this country 
budget support has been very volatile during the full evaluation 
period (Lawson et al., 2016). 
Most countries have a joint Performance Assessment 
Framework. However, harmonisation of assessment and of 
disbursement procedures is not complete, as many donors have 
variable tranches8 with their own disbursement criteria. Yet, in most 
countries variable tranches do not constitute more than 20 percent 
of total volumes (Lawson et al., 2014: 31). This also holds for Ghana 
(Particip GmbH, 2017: 27). In Burundi and Sierra Leone, donors 
have maintained their own assessment and disbursement criteria. 
With these two exceptions the degree of harmonisation of 
assessment and disbursement criteria appears to be high, but this 
mainly holds for the earlier years. As shown below, with the 
increasing importance of governance criteria, the degree of 
harmonisation decreased.  
                                                 
8 A variable tranche is a portion (tranche) of budget support for which 
disbursement is dependent on meeting a certain condition (a policy or an 
outcome). This is opposed to the fixed tranche which will be disbursed anyway. 
  
38 Table 3. Budget support disbursements (inputs) in recent evaluation countries, annual averages 
 
Mali 
(2003-
09) 
Mozambique 
(2005-12) 
Tanzania 
(2004-11) 
Zambia 
(2005-
10) 
Burkina 
Faso (2009-
14) 
Uganda 
(2004-
13) 
Ghana 
(2005-
15)*** 
Sierra Leone 
(2002-13) 
Burundi**** 
(2005-13) 
BS volume (US$ 
million) 
182 414 660 186 312 253 309 68 81 
As % of ODA** 23 20 28 16 27 17 22 14 18 
As % of total 
expenditure** 
12 15 15 7 12 15 6 15 23 
Number of BS 
providers 
10 19 14 9 9 12 11 4 7 
Source: Lawson et al 2014, and country evaluations of Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Uganda. 
*For Burkina Faso, Burundi, and Uganda percentages have been computed on the basis of estimated numbers from graphs.  **Amount was in EUR, converted 
against US$ by using annual average inter-bank rate from OANDA website, accessed 21 August 2017. 
***As % of ODA holds for 2006-15 and is computed from OECD, CRS data on gross disbursements 
****Number for percentage of government expenditure excludes capital expenditure.
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Earlier studies have shown that predictability of budget support was 
sometimes lower at the start of budget support but has improved in 
all cases (Dijkstra et al., 2012; IDD and Associates, 2006). According 
to a British study, the relation between commitments and 
disbursements was 96 percent on average for the period 2000-01 till 
2007-08 (National Audit Office, 2008). Similarly, high levels of 
predictability of disbursements (of between 80 and 100 percent of 
commitments) hold for countries that have been evaluated more 
recently, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and 
Uganda. Budget support in the two post-conflict countries was 
much more volatile and less predictable. In Sierra Leone, for 
example, disbursements fluctuated between 60 and 170 percent of 
commitments.  Yet, budget support was still more predictable than 
project aid (Lawson et al., 2016). In other countries volatility of 
budget support was limited, apart from a gradual decline visible 
from around 2010 onward. 
In all countries, however, the within-year predictability has been 
much more problematic. Ghana, Tanzania and Mozambique are 
exceptions (Lawson et al.,2014: 31; Particip GmbH, 2017: 38). Most 
disbursements came at the end of the year and often later than 
planned, compromising budget management and sometimes leading 
to higher domestic debts, as in Mali (Lawson et al., 2011), or earlier 
in Rwanda and Mozambique (IDD and Associates, 2006), or to lack 
of productive use of budget support, as in Nicaragua (Dijkstra & 
Grigsby, 2010).  
In recent years, predictability has decreased in most countries due 
to suspensions of budget support, often for reasons related to 
political issues, corruption or human rights violations. This is also 
concluded by Orth et al. (2017). 
In summary, budget support resources are aligned to 
government systems by definition, and the volumes of budget 
support in the evaluation countries have been high. In recent years, 
however, volumes have declined thus decreasing the degree of 
alignment. In most countries, donors have achieved a high degree 
of harmonisation in assessment and disbursement criteria, at least in 
“normal” periods, in which governance issues did not dominate the 
policy dialogue yet. Within-year predictability remained a cause for 
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concern in many countries, with donors disbursing later than 
promised and most flows coming at the end of the year. Budget 
support volatility was not an issue in most countries. The between-
year predictability of budget support disbursements was quite good, 
but it decreased in recent years due to governance-related 
suspensions. 
2.2 Throughputs (2): Selectivity, ownership 
and harmonisation  
As already pointed out in chapter 1, many advantages of budget 
support are based on respect for ownership. This presupposes some 
selectivity in choosing the countries for providing budget support. 
Given the changes in the application of budget support, both 
selectivity and respect for ownership cannot be taken for granted it 
must be investigated to what extent donors have complied with this 
input and throughput. 
For most donors, entry criteria include(d) a commitment to 
poverty reduction policies, a stable macro-economic environment, 
a minimum level of budget transparency and quality of public 
financial management (PFM), and good governance, including low 
corruption, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and some 
degree of democratic accountability. However, in practice countries 
began to receive budget support without meeting one or more of 
these criteria. While the macro-economic situation was usually good 
and countries had Poverty Reduction Strategies (although there 
were sometimes doubts on commitment to them), the quality of 
PFM was often weak and the governance situation was far from 
ideal (Dijkstra et al., 2012). 
In a quantitative analysis, there proved to be little relation 
between governance scores in 2000 and received budget support 
during 2002-2010. On the other hand, there was a high correlation 
between qualifying for the HIPC initiative in the early 2000s and the 
receipt of budget support during that decade (Dijkstra et al., 2012). 
This points to path dependency being more important than 
selectivity in budget support allocation. 
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In all countries for which evaluations are available, the 
institutional mechanism for conducting the policy dialogue around 
budget support is defined in a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) between the recipient government and the donors. These 
MoUs usually contain Underlying Principles (UP), to which 
countries must adhere for the long-term continuation of budget 
support, and Performance Assessment Frameworks (PAF) 
containing performance indicators that are monitored and adjusted 
annually. 
Lawson et al. (2014) lists the UP for Tanzania as a representative 
example for most countries. Next to sound macro-economic 
management, commitment to poverty reduction, sound budgeting 
and PFM systems, the UP also include respect for human rights, rule 
of law, democratic principles, independence of the judiciary, 
accountability of government to its citizens, and active fight against 
corruption. It is clear that this list is very similar to the eligibility 
criteria listed above, implying that most recipient countries did not 
comply with these criteria at the start of budget support. This 
confirms the limited selectivity. 
Most earlier evaluations and studies of budget support conclude 
that the attempt to influence policies and governance has come to 
dominate the respect for ownership. 9  In addition, the policy 
dialogue is not just about policies or technocratic aspects of 
governance such as PFM, but increasingly also about more political 
aspects of governance, including the extent of democracy, 
independence of the judiciary, respect for the rule of law and for 
human rights (Dijkstra et al., 2012; Hayman, 2011; Swedlund, 2013).  
With respect to the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF), 
it generally contains indicators for macro-economic stabilisation, 
improvement of PFM, and for poverty budgets and policies. The 
extent of country ownership of the indicators varies between 
countries and also over time, but usually it is not very high (Dijkstra 
                                                 
9 This holds, at least, for low or lower middle-income countries. Ronsholt (2014) 
concludes that respect for ownership is higher in countries with lower aid 
dependence and fewer donors, thus in higher middle-income countries.  
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et al., 2012). Among the countries more recently evaluated, there 
was very little ownership in Burundi, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Sierra 
Leone.10 In Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda, the number of 
indicators and their level of ambition increased over time on the 
instigation of the donors (Lawson et al 2014), often towards 
“unrealistically high” levels (IEG and Particip GmbH, 2016: 15). 
This also points to decreasing ownership. In Ghana, the leading role 
of the government has also decreased over time, despite a decrease 
in the number of performance targets (Particip GmbH, 2017: 55). 
In Sierra Leone, the PAF itself was small but all involved donors 
had separate, additional disbursement indicators (Lawson et al., 
2016). The recent reviews of budget support also conclude that 
ownership is limited, and that conditionality dominates the policy 
dialogue (Orth et al., 2017; Ronsholt, 2014). 
In general, and although PAF indicators are considered 
disbursement triggers, it is usually not defined which percentage of 
the indicators must be met, and different donors have different ideas 
on the relative importance of different indicators. In sum, although 
in general there is a large degree of harmonisation in the PAFs, it is 
not complete. The extent of harmonisation, especially in the 
assessment, has further decreased in recent years because PAFs have 
come to include indicators related to political governance. 
Molenaers (2012) studied five budget support donors and found 
that three of them were of the view that political governance should 
be part of the regular policy dialogue around budget support. She 
shows that three donors assess the eligibility criteria (so the UPs, as 
these are similar) annually, and that in all five countries headquarters 
play an important role in the decisions on eligibility and on 
suspensions. Given that officers in headquarters are closer to their 
political superiors and also to the media, these decisions are likely to 
be heavily influenced by domestic political factors in the donor 
country. 
Studies and evaluations coincide that the UPs are formulated in 
vague terms, that it is not specified what is considered as a breach, 
and that clear procedures for assessing the principles or for defining 
                                                 
10 This evaluation specifically notes lack of ownership of the sectoral ministries, 
health and education (Lawson et al., 2016).  
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corrective actions are lacking. This leaves a lot of discretion with 
individual donors. When asked what they consider a breach of the 
UPs (Molenaers 2012), one donor said that a fundamental break 
with the UPs would be a reason for suspending budget support, 
while another argued that lack of progress with the UPs would 
already be sufficient. Three had an intermediate position, arguing 
that a deterioration in the UPs would be a reason for withdrawing 
budget support. In conclusion, harmonisation of the UPs is limited 
to their formulation and does not cover concrete assessment criteria 
or procedures for how to handle perceived breaches.  
Overall, it can be concluded that selectivity at entry was limited 
and that donors had difficulties in respecting ownership of the 
recipient government. This lack of respect for ownership seems to 
have increased over time. There proves to be a vicious circle, 
increasing donor dissatisfaction with country performance, often on 
governance issues, leading to ever higher ambitions for the policy 
dialogue, in turn causing more dissatisfaction. This has negatively 
affected the quality of the policy dialogue but has also led to budget 
support suspensions and withdrawals. All this compromises the 
original technocratic idea of budget support providing long-term 
predictable financing for poverty reduction. It also reduces donor 
harmonisation. Although there are joint structures for the policy 
dialogue in the form of UPs and PAFs, there is very little 
harmonisation of actual assessments of these principles and of 
performance. 
2.3 Outputs (1): Transaction costs 
Harmonisation and alignment should lead to lower transaction costs 
as compared to project aid. Evaluations generally conclude that 
transaction costs of budget support are still somewhat high, for 
example, due to (too) many negotiations on – often too large – joint 
assessment frameworks. In addition, they observe that there is still 
a lot of project aid. However, Bigsten and Tengstam (2015: 79) 
estimate, based on data from Sida on the different administrative 
costs on the side of the donor, that transaction costs of budget 
support are only one-third of those of project aid. To this we can 
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add reduced transaction costs for the recipient government given 
that existing local systems for planning, budgeting, implementation 
and reporting are used instead of separate systems for each project. 
Overall budget support has been accompanied by much lower 
transaction costs per aid dollar spent than project aid, for both 
donor and recipient (Dijkstra et al., 2012). 
The evaluations of Mali and Burkina Faso conclude that 
transaction costs have decreased over the evaluation period. In 
Ghana they remained low. However, some other recent evaluations, 
in particular those on Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, 
conclude that transactions costs have recently increased due to the 
increasing focus on political topics in the policy dialogue and the 
diverging views among donors on dealing with these topics. In most 
countries, the share of budget support in total aid has declined in 
recent years, which has increased transaction costs per dollar spent 
in this modality (see also Orth et al. 2017). In the countries where 
harmonisation among donors is still limited, Burundi and Sierra 
Leone, transaction costs have not decreased much at all (ADE, 
2015; Lawson et al., 2016).  
In conclusion, budget support has decreased transaction costs 
but these benefits have decreased over time due to more intensive 
governance discussions and lower volumes of budget support.  
2.4 Outputs (2): Macro-economic stability, 
public spending and revenues  
Programme aid, including budget support, has been important in 
several countries for achieving macro-economic stability in the 
sense of reducing budget deficits and inflation. This was especially 
the case in countries like Nicaragua, Mozambique and Uganda in 
the early 1990s – countries that then had just emerged from civil 
wars. The same positive effect on macro-economic stability was 
found in the recent budget support evaluations in Burkina Faso, 
Burundi and Sierra Leone (ADE, 2015; Lawson et al., 2016; Particip 
GmbH, 2016). 
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The evaluation of budget support in Burkina Faso observes that 
next to resources, the policy dialogue, technical assistance, and 
external actors like IMF and the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union played a role in reducing the budget deficit 
(Particip GmbH, 2016: 20). In Burundi, budget support was initially 
used to pay external arrears on debt in order for the country to 
qualify for the HIPC initiative, thus also contributing to macro-
economic stability. In Sierra Leone, budget support helped to reduce 
the deficit during the global financial crisis in 2009 and during the 
Ebola crisis in 2014. In the other countries, macro-economic 
stability was usually achieved before budget support started and was 
then maintained. In some other countries part of budget support 
resources has been used to pay-off domestic debts, thus fostering 
macro-economic stability in the future. This was found for Mali, 
Nicaragua and more recently for Burkina Faso. 
In some cases, budget support endangered this stability 
temporarily, for example when governments had to borrow on the 
domestic market in order to compensate for late or failing budget 
support disbursements. In earlier years this happened in Malawi, 
Nicaragua, Mozambique and Rwanda (IDD and associates, 2006). 
Late or suspended disbursements, often as a result of variable 
tranches, led in some years to increased domestic borrowing more 
recently in Mali, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia (IEG and 
Particip, 2015; Lawson et al., 2014; Lawson et al., 2016).  
In Ghana, budget support resources helped to cushion the 
effects of external shocks and temporary falls in government 
income, for example after the 2008 crisis. Macro-economic stability 
was also an issue in the policy dialogue. Budget deficits and public 
debts began to increase from 2006 onwards, despite the received 
budget support and despite higher tax and non-tax (oil) income. 
This was due to large increases in public wages and high public 
spending in pre-election periods (Particip GmbH, 2017: 39-40). 
Budget support could not prevent these irresponsible macro-
economic policies. However, the collective suspension of budget 
support at the end of 2013 contributed to a new agreement of the 
government with IMF in 2015, after which budget support was 
resumed.  
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In general, the most important financial effect of budget support 
has been to increase government expenditure. Dijkstra et al. (2012) 
show econometrically that an increase in budget support of 1 
percent of GDP is accompanied by an increase in government 
expenditure of around 0.6 percent of GDP.11 This would suggest 
that on average, 60 percent of budget support resources is used for 
additional spending. Almost all country evaluations of budget 
support confirm that there is a link between budget support and 
additional spending. Nicaragua proved to be an exception. In this 
country, uncertain and late disbursements prevented the 
government from spending these resources. Instead, they were all 
used for reducing domestic debts. 
Of the four evaluations synthesised in Lawson et al. (2014), Mali, 
Mozambique and Tanzania also saw increased government 
expenditure as a result of budget support. Although in Zambia total 
government expenditure as percent of GDP did not increase, 
spending for priority sectors proved to exceed budget support 
resources. The evaluators conclude that this increase was the result 
of budget support resources, policy dialogues for general and sector 
budget support, and ownership (De Kemp, Faust, & Leiderer, 
2011). 
An important assumption in achieving increased government 
spending with budget support is that there are no negative incentive 
effects on government revenues. In their econometric analysis, 
Dijkstra et al. (2012) show that there is no effect of budget support 
on tax revenues. This effect is confirmed by the six cases examined 
in their study, as well as by Orth et al. (2017). At the same time, Orth 
et al. (2017) report that revenues did not substantially increase, thus 
possibly endangering the sustainability of the achievements of 
budget support. The more recent country evaluations have mixed 
conclusions on the behaviour of tax revenues. While concern about 
limited progress in increasing tax revenues is expressed for 
                                                 
11 For the period 2002-2010. Instrumenting for budget support leads to a 
slightly lower coefficient (around 0.5), pointing to some endogeneity and 
showing that part of budget support may be a response to expected government 
deficits. 
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Burundi, 12  Sierra Leone and Uganda, government revenues 
substantially increased in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mozambique and 
Tanzania. 
Spending on priority sectors as defined in the Poverty Reduction 
Strategies increased in virtually all countries as a result of budget 
support (Dijkstra et al. 2012, Ronsholt 2014, Orth et al. 2017). There 
were large increases in spending for priority sectors in most recently 
evaluated countries: Burundi, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mozambique, 
Sierra Leone Tanzania and Zambia. Uganda and Ghana are 
exceptions. In Uganda, spending for the priority sectors health, 
education and water increased until 2004, but stagnated later due to 
changed government priorities and reduced budget support (IEG 
and Particip, 2015). In Ghana, pro-poor spending as share of total 
spending and as share of GDP decreased between 2006 and 2015. 
Yet, budget support was able to ringfence some of this spending, in 
particular until 2012 (Particip, 2017: 39, xiii). 
What the priority sectors are varies from country to country, but 
education and health have been important (almost) everywhere. 
Some studies have tried to establish effects on spending for these 
sectors econometrically. Dijkstra et al (2012) found that an increase 
in budget support by one percent of GDP led to an increase in 
health expenditure of between 0.14 and 0.37 percent of GDP. When 
instrumenting for budget support the coefficient was highly 
significant. They found a larger average effect on education 
expenditure, but this coefficient was not significant due to an 
insufficient number of countries for which data on education 
spending is available. Fernandes Antunes et al. (2013) examined the 
effect of budget support on health expenditure, in particular, and 
conclude that there was no effect. They used lags for all variables in 
order to control for endogeneity, applying a system GMM model. 
However, total government expenditure was one of the 
independent variables in their model and it may well be that budget 
support influenced health spending through its effect on total 
spending.  Another limitation of this study is that the authors did 
                                                 
12 Tax revenues first increased substantially to 15.2% of GDP in 2011, but then 
decreased again to 12.8% in 2013 (p. 58). 
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not include the budget support from the World Bank (Poverty 
Reduction Support Credits, PRSCs) in their data. 
Table 4 lists the conclusions of the country evaluations on 
budget-support-induced spending increases for selected (as per 
these evaluations) priority sectors. These conclusions are usually 
based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative sources, such 
as interviews. 
A recent evaluation of the effects of the withdrawal of the 
Netherlands from 18 priority countries around 2012 provides 
further evidence. It includes case studies of six countries, four of 
which had received Dutch budget support (Burkina Faso, 
Nicaragua, Tanzania and Zambia).  For these four countries, the 
evaluation concludes that expenditure for the priority sectors would 
have been higher if Dutch budget support had continued (de Kemp 
& Lobbrecht, 2016). 
The overall conclusion can be that budget support has 
contributed to achieving or, depending on the situation in the 
recipient country, maintaining macro-economic stability. In most 
countries, it has also led to increased spending for priority sectors 
as defined in the Poverty Reduction Strategies. On average, budget 
support does not seem to have induced a decrease in domestic tax 
revenues but there are large differences between countries.  
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Table 4. Sectors benefiting from expenditure increases due to Budget Support 
 
Education Health Roads Water Agriculture Social Good governance 
Burkina Faso 09-14 Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
   
Burundi 05-13 Yes Yes 
     
Ghana 04-10 Yes Yes 
     
Ghana 05-15  Yes, 
until 
2012 
  Yes Yes  
Mali 03-09 Yes Yes 
   
Yes 
 
Mozambique 05-12 Yes 
   
Yes 
 
Yes 
Nicaragua 05-08 No increase over this period 
Sierra Leone 02-13 Yes Yes Yes 
    
Tanzania 04-11 Yes 
 
Yes 
    
Uganda 04-13* Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
   
Vietnam 01-06** Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
   
Zambia 05-10 Yes 
   
Yes 
  
Note *. Government priorities changed and budget support was reduced, so hardly increases after around 2007. 
Note **. Interpretations vary on whether increases were due to budget support. 
Sources: Dijkstra et al (2012) for Ghana 04-10, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Lawson et al (2014) for Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, and more recent 
evaluations for  Burundi, Burkina Faso, Ghana 05-15, Sierra Leone and Uganda. 
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Chapter 3. Effects of the policy 
dialogue 
The main focus in this chapter is on effects of the donor attempts 
to influence, often called “policy and institutional effects” of budget 
support (Van der Linde & Valmarana, 2012). But there is also 
attention for the systemic effects. Systemic effects are usually 
defined as “flow-of funds” effects: the effect of the use of 
government systems for planning, budgeting, implementation and 
monitoring on the quality of these systems and on domestic 
democratic accountability. But as several evaluations note, there 
may also be systemic effects of the policy dialogue, in particular on 
policy planning, coordination and implementation and also on 
democratic accountability, to the extent that civil society actors 
participate in the dialogue. On the other hand, there can be negative 
systemic effects of the policy dialogue on domestic accountability if 
it leads to more outward accountability, to the donors, instead of 
inward accountability, to citizens and parliament.  
After discussing the systemic effects of the policy dialogue on 
policy making, this chapter continues by analysing the systemic plus 
policy dialogue effects of budget support on PFM and domestic 
accountability, and the influence of donors on poverty reduction 
policies and good governance. The effect of dialogue and resources 
on poverty expenditure has already been dealt in Chapter 2. In all these 
areas, it is often difficult to disentangle the influence of the policy 
dialogue from that of other factors, in particular the technical 
assistance or capacity development programmes that have been set 
up and financed by donors.  
3.1 Systemic effects of the policy dialogue 
on policy making 
Earlier evaluations and studies concluded that the dialogue around 
budget support has increased the coordinating role of the Ministry 
of Finance and on the coordination between ministries (De Renzio, 
2006). Some more recent evaluations confirm this. Budget support 
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has increased the focus on indicators and on results in the policy 
process in Mali. In Tanzania, Mozambique and Zambia the number 
of indicators in the PAF was too high and they were often donor-
driven. This led to lower participation of high level civil servants 
(Lawson et al., 2014). This hampered positive systemic effects on 
national policy making. In Sierra Leone, the policy dialogue helped 
to set up a framework for establishing and monitoring national 
policy targets that had not existed before (Lawson et al., 2016). In 
Burundi and Burkina Faso such positive effects could not be 
observed. In Burundi the policy dialogue was fragmented by donor 
and by sector. In Burkina, there were initially separate dialogue 
frameworks for budget support and for poverty reduction. In 2008 
the two frameworks were merged, which led to some increase in 
ownership and also to participation of civil society. But the quality 
of sectoral dialogues varied. 
In Ghana, budget support contributed to modest improvements 
in policy formulation and intra-sector policy coordination. Over 
time, the interest of both the government and the donors in the 
policy dialogue diminished. On the donor side, Ghana’s 
achievement of middle income status in 2010 was perceived to lead 
to lower leverage for budget support. The government increasingly 
lost interest due to improved access to other financing sources, such 
as oil income, Eurobonds and aid from new donors like China. All 
this reduced the systemic and other possible effects of the policy 
dialogue. 
All in all, the results are mixed. An important condition for seeing 
positive systemic effects on domestic policy making seems to be that 
donors succeed in coordinating their preferences for the PAF 
focusing on a limited number of indicators. In addition, volumes of 
budget support need to be sufficiently large (relative to other 
sources) in order to keep the attention of high-level public officers 
and the trust of donors that the policy dialogue has some leverage. 
3.2 Public Financial Management 
PFM indicators constitute an important part of the PAFs and of the 
dialogue. Furthermore, the perceived fiduciary risks involved in 
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budget support have induced donors to provide high levels of 
technical assistance in this area. While improvements in PFM can 
be registered, it is difficult to conclude on whether and to what 
extent they are due to systemic effects, donor influence through the 
policy dialogue, or technical assistance. 
Many evaluations and also synthesis studies conclude that the use 
of government systems for planning and budgeting has improved 
budget transparency (Dijkstra & Grigsby, 2010; Lawson et al., 2014; 
Ronsholt, 2014; Schmitt, 2017). They also report, however, that the 
share of budget support and on-budget aid13 in total aid is low. For 
example in Mozambique, 46% of aid was off-budget (Schmitt, 
2017). In Uganda, the share of off-budget aid from all sources14 
increased over the evaluation period to 84 percent (IEG and 
Particip, 2015: 13).  
Most earlier evaluations conclude that budget support has led to 
some improvements in PFM and that indeed part of these 
improvements are due to the technical assistance that has 
accompanied budget support (Dijkstra et al., 2012; IDD and 
Associates, 2006). This is also reported by the more recent syntheses 
of evaluation results (Ronsholt 2014, Orth et al. 2017). Orth et al. 
(2017: 50) conclude that the inputs “policy dialogue” and “capacity 
development/technical assistance” have a positive effect on PFM 
systems while there is not sufficient evidence for a separate positive 
effect of the resources (the systemic effect). The combination of 
financial and non-financial inputs is definitely effective. They also 
observe that improvements in PFM, in particular, depend on the 
political will of the recipient government to carry out PFM reforms. 
In a regression analysis carried out across 100 countries, De Renzio, 
Andrews and Mills (2010) find that budget support is associated 
with higher quality of PFM systems.  
Lawson et al. (2014) report improvements in budget 
transparency in Mozambique and Tanzania, but not in Mali and 
Zambia. They also note that despite the improvements, there are 
still substantial PFM problems in all countries, for example in 
                                                 
13 On-budget aid is all aid that is a) transferred to the government and b) 
included in the national budget. 
14 So including from NGOs. 
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budget credibility and in expenditure control, in particular with 
regard to local governments or other autonomous agencies. The 
Uganda evaluation comes to similar conclusions. Budget support, 
through the policy dialogue and accompanying technical assistance, 
has contributed to substantial improvements in the quality of 
budgeting and planning and in the efficiency of public spending, 
especially in the earlier period. But budget credibility is still weak15 
and there is limited transparency in inter-governmental fiscal flows. 
In addition, from 2009 onward the indicators for PFM are 
deteriorating. In Ghana, there have been some improvements in 
PFM, such as harmonisation of the budget classification structure, 
improved budget transparency and improved legislative 
environment for, in particular, auditing. The evaluators conclude 
that budget support has contributed to this progress. Burundi has 
also witnessed some progress in PFM but continues to face 
problems of budget credibility, budget execution, and expenditure 
control. In Sierra Leone, budget support and the accompanying 
technical assistance had a modest contribution to increased budget 
transparency and improved PFM systems. Despite having indicators 
in the PAF for reforms to payroll and procurement systems, political 
resistance prevented these indicators from being met. From 2010 
onwards, the quality of PFM systems has deteriorated somewhat 
(Lawson et al., 2016). 
All in all, most of the more recent evaluations confirm the earlier 
conclusions that the combination of the use of domestic systems, 
attention in the policy dialogue, and technical assistance has led to 
improvements in PFM. However, in Uganda and Sierra Leone, the 
PFM indicators are deteriorating in recent years. In Uganda this 
coincides with, and may be due to, much lower budget support 
volumes, but this is not the case in Sierra Leone. 
 
                                                 
15 The evaluators note that budget support is in part responsible for the lack of 
budget credibility, as the first “supplementary budget” in the year is a result of 
the late confirmation by donors of their contributions (IEG and Particip 
2015:37). 
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3.3 Domestic accountability 
There are many definitions of accountability. In general, 
accountability involves three stages (Bovens, 2010; Lindberg, 2013): 
first the agent (A), held to account in a certain domain, must provide 
information on that domain to the accountee or principal (P), 
second P may ask questions and A is obliged to answer, explain or 
justify its behaviour, and third, P assesses A’s performance and may 
apply sanctions. When speaking of democratic accountability, the 
agent A is the government and the principal P is the population at 
large, or their representatives or spokespersons like parliament, civil 
society and media. This can also be called vertical accountability, as 
it involves the relations between state and citizens. Horizontal 
accountability is about the relation between different organs of the 
state. It involves the relation between the executive and formal 
oversight institutions such as Supreme Audit Institutions, 
ombudspersons, or parliaments.16 Both types of accountability will 
be fostered with increased transparency of public budgeting and 
reporting systems, so there is a clear relationship with improved 
PFM. In analysing the effects of budget support on democratic 
accountability, many studies make a distinction between the supply 
and the demand side. The supply side of democratic accountability 
focuses on public sector institutions and the demand side on 
citizens, civil society or media.17 
This section starts with briefly analysing the possible systemic 
effects of the policy dialogue on democratic accountability, then 
continues with possible effects on, first, horizontal and then vertical 
accountability. 
In several countries, civil society representatives were allowed to 
participate in sectoral dialogues but hardly ever in the national 
dialogue on general budget support. Ghana is an exception. In this 
country, donors made efforts to have civil society participate in the 
policy dialogue and in the review of the PAF. But overall, the 
                                                 
16 Parliaments can be seen as involved in both horizontal (as they are public 
sector institutions) and vertical (as they represent citizens) accountability. 
17 Again, parliaments can be on both sides. 
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systemic contribution of budget support in this area has been 
limited.  
Orth et al. (2017: xvii) conclude that budget processes as well as 
Supreme Audit Institutions improved as a result of budget support, 
but that it is not clear whether that is due to systemic effects of the 
resources or to policy influence. Lawson et al. (2014) report 
improvements in Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI) in Zambia, 
Mozambique and Tanzania. They observe that SAIs also benefitted 
from increased budgets, facilitated by GBS resources. The same 
combination of GBS-induced attention and resources has benefitted 
the SAI in Uganda (IEG and Particip, 2015: 38). In Sierra Leone 
budget support contributed to the setting up of institutions like a 
SAI and parliamentary accounts committees. This led to more 
transparency of budgets and accounts. In Mali, however, the donors 
had pressured the government to include indicators on 
decentralisation, public sector reform and for the establishment of 
an independent Court of Audit but they were not met. In Ghana, 
the policy dialogue and accompanying capacity development 
strengthened some accountability institutions such as Ghana Audit 
Service, the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative 
Justice, and the Public Accounts Committee of the Parliament. 
However, these institutions are still too weak to carry out their 
oversight role well (Particip, 2017: 55, 59, 60).  
Orth et al. (2017) conclude that there are no consistent positive 
effects of budget support on the demand side of accountability, 
which they define as consisting of parliament and civil society. This 
is confirmed in the more recent evaluations, showing mixed results. 
On the positive side, in Sierra Leone the budget support-induced 
increased transparency of budgets and accounts led to more 
awareness in the media and civil society of governance and 
corruption issues. In Burkina Faso, budget support contributed to 
improving the oversight of PFM and of corruption issues by civil 
society (Particip, 2016). In Ghana, budget support donors have 
helped further strengthening civil society organisations and their 
role in, in particular, sector policies, has increased (Particip, 2017). 
On the other hand, in Uganda the parliamentary Public Accounts 
Committee publicly debates SAI reports but is overburdened and 
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has been unable to consider all. For Burundi, evaluators conclude 
that the main effect of budget support is an increased accountability 
to donors, away from parliament and civil society (ADE, 2015).  
Schmitt digs deeper into the effects of budget support on 
domestic accountability in Mozambique (Schmitt, 2017). He 
confirms the evaluation result (ITAD, 2014) that budget support 
strengthened the institutions at the supply side of accountability, 
including the SAI. But there has been less support for institutions at 
the demand side. Yet, he observes that the number of civil society 
organisations active in accountability issues has increased. 
Representatives of these institutions confirm that budget support 
has led the government to improve PFM and transparency, but that 
this transparency is still limited, especially with respect to budget 
execution, revenues and at local level. Overall, democratic 
accountability in the country is still weak. 
In sum, the systemic effects of budget support on increasing 
domestic democratic accountability seem to be limited. The policy 
dialogue is between donors and executive, and the use of local 
systems and budgets did not automatically generate interest among 
parliament or civil society actors. However, budget support and 
accompanying capacity building activities did lead to improvements 
in the supply side of domestic accountability, increasing 
transparency of budgets and of budget execution – through 
strengthening the SAIs and related oversight institutions. Direct 
donor support to institutions on the demand side was usually more 
limited. Yet in some countries (Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone) 
parliaments, media and/or civil society have grasped the increased 
opportunities to hold governments to account.  
3.4 Corruption 
Budget support is often said to entail fiduciary risks and thus to fuel 
corruption. It is always difficult to measure corruption itself. Most 
existing measures are based on perceptions and suffer from severe 
weaknesses (Arndt & Oman, 2006; Kenny, 2017). When looking at 
the relation between the amount of budget support received (as 
percent of GDP) between 2002 and 2010, and the change in the 
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World Governance Indicator for Control of Corruption between 
2000 and 2010, there proves to be a weakly significant positive 
correlation (Dijkstra et al., 2012). This positive association between 
budget support and the reduction of corruption is the more 
surprising, as there was no relation between budget support and the 
level of the corruption indicator in 2000. However, the qualitative 
evidence from the six cases in that same study shows that there are 
only limited effects of budget support on controlling corruption. 
But there is certainly no proof for budget support increasing 
corruption in the recipient countries. Ronsholt (2014) states that no 
conclusion is possible on the effect of budget support on 
corruption.  
Budget support contributed to improvements in the legislative 
and institutional framework for combating corruption in 
Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda and to some extent 
also in Ghana (Lawson et al., 2014, IEG and Particip, 2015, Lawson 
et al., 2016, Particip, 2017). Of course, these are first steps and they 
are in itself not sufficient for eliminating corruption. To the 
contrary, when there is more oversight and more awareness, it is 
likely that more corruption scandals appear. A common conclusion 
of these evaluations is that although more corruption is detected, 
government could do much more in prosecuting the culprits. But 
there are also cases with more limited success. In Burundi, the lack 
of coordination of donors in the policy dialogue and in the provision 
of technical assistance led to disappointing results in the building up 
of institutions. If anything, corruption increased in the evaluation 
period (ADE, 2015). In Burkina Faso, budget transparency 
increased, the Court of Audit was strengthened and an anti-
corruption law was adopted and this helped civil society in its fight 
against corruption. But the lack of government commitment in this 
area hampered success (Particip GmbH, 2016: 23,26). Budget 
support did not manage to adequately deal with endemic corruption 
among the highest government levels. 
Orth et al. (2017) conclude that budget support has a positive 
effect on the efforts in monitoring corruption, but that prosecution 
and punishment is still limited. These authors also state that contrary 
to some expectations, there is no evidence of budget support having 
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increased corruption. This seems to be an adequate summary of the 
existing evidence.   
3.5 Poverty reduction policies 
The experience with structural adjustment policies was that donor 
attempts to “buy” policy reforms with conditionality did not work. 
Political factors within recipient countries determine whether policy 
reforms are carried out (Collier et al. 1997; Dijkstra, 2002; Killick, 
Gunatilaka, & Marr, 1998). However, the case of the policy dialogue 
around budget support could be slightly different, in particular with 
regard to poverty reduction policies. Around 2000 all countries, 
both donors and recipients, have agreed to achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Although there may be 
more or less agreement on, and government commitment with, the 
countries’ Poverty Reduction Strategies, these strategies are usually 
focused on achieving the MDGs. This may facilitate a dialogue 
focusing more on the “how” of achieving these goals than on the 
“what”. This does not exclude of course that actual choices may 
bring fundamental disagreements to the fore. 
However, and in line with the centrality of the MDGs, most 
Poverty Reduction Strategies targeted mainly the social sectors and 
sometimes some other priority sectors like water and roads. They 
seldom included strategic analysis of how government policies 
would reduce income poverty (see also Lawson et al., 2014). This lack 
of insight also held for donors participating in the policy dialogue. 
The policy theory of budget support is relatively silent on how 
budget support is supposed to lead to income poverty reduction. 
On the one hand, donors expected economic growth to trickle 
down to the poor, and on the other, they expected that 
improvements in social and physical infrastructure for the poor 
(health, education, roads) help to increase their incomes.  
In practice donors seem to have had limited influence on poverty 
reduction policies. In Vietnam and to some extent in Nicaragua 
(after 2007) governments themselves carried out policies that 
targeted the poor and there was no donor influence on these policies 
(Dijkstra et al., 2012). On the other hand, donors did not manage to 
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change the maize subsidies in Zambia that mainly benefited the rich 
farmers and not the poor (De Kemp et al., 2011). In Mozambique, 
donors were not able to change ineffective agricultural policies 
either (ITAD, 2014). 
In Uganda, the donors have not been able to prevent the change 
in priorities by the Ugandan government to productive 
infrastructure and military expenditure. From 2008 onward, the 
policy dialogue was held with the Office of the Prime Minister as 
central actor instead of with the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development. This implied that donors had even less influence on 
sector policies. In Burkina Faso, the donors did not give much 
attention to sectors that were important for income poverty 
reduction, such as agriculture or small and medium enterprises (IEG 
and Particip, 2015: x). And they hardly discussed the high 
population growth, another important factor influencing poverty 
reduction. In Ghana, the policy dialogue contributed to 
strengthening targeted social interventions, which, however, are 
reported to have “modest results” (Particip, 2017: 79). In Sierra 
Leone the effect of the policy dialogue on health and education 
sector policies was limited. In health, the policy dialogue in Sector 
Budget Support was more effective in supporting reforms, notably 
in payroll policies. 
A common observation in many evaluations is that the policy 
dialogue focused too much on setting and monitoring performance 
levels on a large number of individual indicators, while neglecting 
strategic discussions on solving bottlenecks for public service 
provision or economic growth (IEG, 2010; Particip GmbH, 2016; 
Lawson et al., 2014, Ronsholt 2014; Particip, 2017). In the more 
recent years, 18  policy dialogues have focused increasingly on 
governance issues, again reducing the attention for poverty policies.  
Holvoet and Ingberg (2015) examine the effect of two policy 
dialogue-related instruments on the increase in female primary 
enrolment rates, using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) for 
14 African countries. The two instruments are, on the one hand, the 
use of sex-disaggregated indicators for primary enrolment in the 
                                                 
18 This varies by country, in Nicaragua it started already in 2007 (Dijkstra, 2013). 
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PAF, and on the other, the establishment of gender working groups. 
They include several over variables that may explain increased girls’ 
enrolment, namely aid, aid to education, income level, the existence 
of free primary education and the extent of institutional gender 
discrimination in the country. They find that both sex-disaggregated 
indicators and gender working groups have a high correlation with 
positive outcomes. In highly aid dependent countries with low 
gender discrimination, gender working groups, which they call “soft 
incentives”, are sufficient for increasing female primary enrolment. 
In countries with more gender discrimination, both gender working 
groups and sex-disaggregated indicators (“hard incentives”) are 
necessary for a positive outcome, but they are not sufficient.  
In conclusion, the example of the donor influence on improving 
female enrolment shows that donors have some possibilities for 
influence. But the evidence of donors using these opportunities for 
influencing poverty reduction policies is scarce. Donors were often 
focused too much on too many individual performance indicators, 
at the cost of a more strategic discussion on how obstacles in public 
service provision could be removed or economic growth could be 
fostered. Donors were also often hindered by a lack of knowledge 
on how budget support or government policies would be able to 
reduce income poverty. However, and in line with the previous 
experience under structural adjustment, where donors tried to make 
policies more pro-poor in areas where this conflicted with 
(perceived) strategic or political interest of the government, they 
have not been successful.  
3.6 Political governance and human rights 
As discussed above, issues like free and fair elections, protection of 
rule of law and of civil and human rights were usually included in 
the Underlying Principles but increasingly also formed part of the 
policy dialogue and of the PAF.  
The IOB evaluation finds that there is a slight positive correlation 
between the amount of budget support received between 2002-
2010, and improvements in some of the World Governance 
Indicators between 2000 and 2010. Apart from control of 
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corruption (discussed above), this also holds for “voice and 
accountability” and “rule of law” and for an overall governance 
score based on factor analysis (Dijkstra et al., 2012). However, the 
coefficients are small, and these correlations do not necessarily 
mean causal relations: other factors may be of influence and the 
causality may be the other way around. 
As also mentioned above, a common conclusion of the earlier 
structural adjustment literature is that governments will only 
implement policies (and other reforms) with which they agree, and 
that they will meet other conditions only partly, cosmetically, with 
severe delays, or not at all. The six countries analysed in the IOB 
study confirm that donors have very limited influence on political 
governance issues and human rights. In Nicaragua and under huge 
pressure of donors, the government adopted a law on merit-based 
appointments of judges, but this was only cosmetically implemented 
and did not change the political influence on the judiciary. 
In Mali and Ghana, the donors focused more on elements of 
technocratic governance than on political governance. In Mali, the 
non-compliance with these governance indicators in the PAF did 
not lead to suspensions or threats of suspensions and a positive 
environment for the policy dialogue in other areas was maintained. 
In the other countries reviewed by Lawson et al. (2014), 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, suspensions did occur, leading 
to a deterioration in the donor-government relationships. However, 
these suspensions were not effective in changing governance. 
Lawson et al. (2014) conclude that when government commitment 
to the Underlying Principles is lacking, threats of suspension of 
budget support are not effective.  
ITAD (2014) reports one positive effect of the policy dialogue 
on governance, namely the decision of the Mozambican 
government to adhere to the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI). This was accomplished by a combination of hard 
and soft incentives. There was an indicator in the PAF, but donors 
also engaged in many other efforts to influence policy makers, such 
as invitations for study tours, a conference in which high-level policy 
makers participated, and technical assistance.  
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Ronsholt (2014) concludes that donor attempts to change 
governance are seldom effective. He adds that donors often have 
different ideas on the promotion of human rights, rule of law and 
democratic accountability, and that this reduces the effectiveness of 
attempts to influence these issues. This is certainly also the 
conclusion of Faust et al. (2012) on the basis of what happened in 
Zambia. They report that when all donors suspended budget 
support after a severe corruption case in 2009, the government 
implemented three reforms demanded by the donors.19 After that, 
donor views began to diverge again and no results were achieved. 
They conclude that if donors agree on the governance goal and 
harmonise their sanctions, they will be successful. However, the 
authors also state that the three reforms adopted did not lead to 
improvements in participation and democratic accountability. The 
– temporary – donor harmonisation may just have led to cosmetic 
or formal reforms, and not to substantial changes.  
After the corruption discovered within the Office of the Prime 
Minister in Uganda in 2012, all donors temporarily suspended 
budget support. The government then took some important 
measures for improving financial management and combating 
corruption. Although some concerns remained, this restored the 
policy dialogue and some donors resumed budget support, although 
in smaller volumes than before (IEG and Particip 2015: 11, 73). In 
Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone and Burundi, donors had very limited 
influence on governance. Corruption indicators deteriorated in the 
evaluation period in Burkina Faso and Burundi. In Sierra Leone, the 
UK’s Directorate for International Development (DfID) 
maintained a variable performance tranche for governance and 
accountability. Rather than stimulating performance, it led to 
frequent delays of part of the disbursements, and in 2007 even to a 
delay in disbursing the fixed tranche (Lawson et al., 2016: 22-23).  
Overall, and in line with earlier literature, the effectiveness of 
donor attempts to influence political governance and human rights 
was limited. This holds in particular for the use of hard incentives, 
such as indicators in PAF, and (threats of) suspension. Soft 
                                                 
19 A salary reform, reform of the budget cycle leading to earlier parliamentary 
approval of the budget and a decentralisation implementation plan.  
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incentives appear to work better. Some authors argue that donors 
would achieve more with more harmonisation, but the evidence for 
this is not very strong.  
3.7 Suspensions and withdrawals  
The increasing attention for governance has led to many 
suspensions and increasingly also to withdrawals of budget support. 
Molenaers et al. (2015) registered 131 cases of budget support 
suspensions by bilateral donors between 2000 and 2011, and most 
of these were for governance reasons. Thirty-one percent of the 
suspensions had to do with corruption, and 41 percent with political 
issues such as electoral fraud, human rights violations or repression 
of the opposition.  
In Ethiopia, problems around the election and oppression of the 
opposition induced a suspension of budget support in 2005. This 
did not lead to an improvement of political governance, and the 
trend was more in the opposite direction. While the World Bank 
continued budget support to the country, most bilateral donors 
ended budget support. The EU took an intermediate position, 
continuing sector budget support and similar modalities (Del 
Biondo & Orbie, 2014). Of the seven countries more recently 
evaluated (Burundi, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mozambique, Sierra 
Leone, Tanzania and Uganda), six have experienced one or more 
suspensions from around 2008 onward. As discussed below, most 
of these suspensions were for governance reasons. Ghana is the 
exception. In this country, donors suspended budget support 
collectively in late 2013 due to concerns on the macro-economic 
situation and on PFM weaknesses. In February 2015, and after the 
government had agreed on a new stabilisation programme with the 
IMF, budget support was resumed. It can be said that the 
suspensions had some influence on the government’s return to the 
IMF and on more responsible macro-economic policies (Particip, 
2017: xiv, 30). 
In Uganda the relation between government and donors already 
deteriorated from around 2004 onward. The donors had difficulties 
in accepting the shifting priorities of the government, away from 
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social spending towards productive infrastructure and growth, and 
the decision to end the additionality of budget support. 
Furthermore, they were unhappy with high-level interference in 
policies, for example the abolishment of the graduated tax (a local 
tax) and the introduction of universal secondary education, and they 
had increasing concerns about governance issues, in particular 
corruption and human rights. After the corruption discovered 
within the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) in 2012, which was 
the principal interlocutor for the budget support donors, many 
donors withdrew their budget support. Six out of twelve donors 
resumed it after the government had established a High-Level 
Action Matrix that focused on specific financial management 
reforms and some other actions. This led indeed to improvements 
in PFM but it did not help to improve prosecution and punishment 
of corruption cases (IEG and Particip, 2015: 39).   
In Tanzania, some donors briefly suspended disbursements in 
2008 after the discovery of two big corruption cases. They wanted 
to pressure the government to take actions in line with the UP to 
“actively fight corruption”. The government took actions but 
several donors felt that more could have been done in prosecuting 
the culprits. Although all donors later agreed that there had not been 
a breach with the UP, trust in the government had decreased and 
this affected the quality of the policy dialogue (ITAD, 2013). In 
Mozambique some donors suspended budget support after 
criticisms of the election process in 2009, and this happened again 
after irregularities found in health procurement in 2011 and in the 
education payroll in 2012. In this country, the latter two suspensions 
were not considered legitimate by the evaluators (ITAD, 2014). In 
both Tanzania and Mozambique, the suspensions had limited effect 
on the government’s resources and hardly brought about changes. 
The main effect of frequent (threats of) suspensions was a lower 
quality of the policy dialogue (Lawson et al. 2014).   
In Burkina Faso donor trust in the government began to decrease 
in 2011, after perceived increases in corruption and increased 
political interference in the management of public expenditure. 
Several donors ended budget support programmes and others 
reduced disbursements. The policy dialogue also changed, focusing 
more on governance issues. However, the donors did not achieve 
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any substantive reforms (Particip GmbH, 2016). In Burundi, and 
after 2010, three donors (Belgium, Norway and The Netherlands) 
lost confidence in the government due to continuing high fiduciary 
risks and political tensions, and a failure to carry out structural 
reforms. They switched from budget support to (sector) common 
funds (ADE, 2015). In Sierra Leone the situation is a bit different: 
there were many delays in disbursements for various reasons. Most 
delays in DfID disbursements in the period 2006-2008 were related 
to governance reasons. As mentioned above, these temporary 
suspensions did not bring about substantial changes, although, by 
way of exception, in 2007 they contributed to the public release of 
a SAI report and to the granting of independent prosecutorial 
powers to the Anti-Corruption Commission. The other three 
(multilateral) donors in this country delayed disbursements for 
incompliance with other variable tranches, for example related to 
performance in PFM or service delivery in health and education. 
There is no evidence of better compliance with PAF indicators 
relevant for disbursement of variable tranches, than for other PAF 
indicators (Lawson et al., 2016). 
In their econometric analysis Molenaers et al. (2015) found that 
suspensions responded to a decrease in an indicator for democracy 
(voice and accountability), and also became more likely with 
multilateral suspensions, higher economic growth of the donor, and 
a larger donor group in the country. On the other hand, higher aid 
dependence and ideological similarity between donor and recipient 
government were associated with lower suspensions.  
All in all, it can be concluded that the stated reasons for most 
suspensions and withdrawals of budget support were related to 
governance concerns in the recipient countries. In most cases 
however, suspensions were not successful in bringing about the 
desired improvements in governance. As revealed by the analysis by 
Molenaers et al. (2015), factors on the donor side also play a role in 
these suspensions. This will be further elaborated upon in chapter 
5. It means that effectiveness of suspensions and withdrawals must 
also be assessed in that perspective. 
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Chapter 4. Poverty reduction 
This chapter examines the contribution of budget support to 
poverty reduction, taking into account the two inputs of budget 
support, resources and policy dialogue. Budget support may have 
contributed to poverty reduction through its impact on expanding 
government spending and through its influence on poverty 
reduction policies. Poverty reduction is here meant to include both 
income poverty reduction, and improvements in social indicators 
(non-income poverty).   
As discussed above, the policy theory on how budget support 
should reduce income poverty is not very well developed. Many 
evaluations observe that countries seldom have well-developed pro-
poor strategies (IEG, 2010; Ronsholt, 2014). Usually, donors and 
countries expect poverty reduction to come about through trickle 
down effects from economic growth, and by investing in social and 
physical assets of the poor. However, this trickle-down effect is by 
no means guaranteed and will be limited in countries with high 
income inequality to begin with. The investment in social and 
physical assets of the poor is expected to bring about improvements 
in social indicators, which in turn probably will lead to higher 
economic growth and to income poverty reduction in the medium 
to long term. Within social indicators, we can make a distinction 
between access indicators, for example, enrolment rates, and access 
to health, water and sanitation, roads, and electricity, and final 
outcome indicators, such as increased literacy rates and reduced 
child and maternal mortality rates.  
Given that economic growth is a necessary – though not 
sufficient – condition for income poverty reduction but also for 
sustained improvement in social indicators, the chapter begins with 
a section on the relation between budget support and economic 
growth. After that, sections on income poverty and non-income 
poverty follow. Analytically, this chapter includes quantitative cross-
section studies that examine the direct effect of budget support on 
the impact variables growth, income poverty and social indicators, 
but also case studies that examine the contribution of budget 
support by tracing its influence through government policies. Most 
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recent case studies include quantitative analysis of the effect of 
government policies on relevant social indicators.   
4.1 Budget support and economic growth 
It is difficult to assess the contribution of budget support to growth, 
as growth usually depends on many factors. Foreign aid in general, 
and budget support in particular, can at most have a small 
contribution. In addition, the analysis needs to take into account 
that countries may receive aid because they have difficulties in 
achieving growth. The more sophisticated and robust econometric 
studies on the effect of aid on growth show that aid has a small 
positive effect on growth, especially in the longer term (Arndt, 
Jones, & Tarp, 2010). The same authors also find a positive long-
run effect of aid on structural transformation and on social 
indicators (Arndt, Jones, & Tarp, 2015).   
Earlier econometric analysis of relative benefits of budget 
support or program aid versus project aid give contradicting results, 
with Cordella and Dell’Aricia (2003) finding that programme aid has 
a more positive effect than project aid, and Ouattara and Strobl 
(2008) concluding the opposite. Bigsten, Platteau and Tengstam 
(2011) find a positive effect of budget support on growth, especially 
after two or three years, but they carried out a simple Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression and this may suffer from endogeneity 
bias. IEG (2010) found more growth in 22 countries with a Poverty 
Reduction Support Credit (PRSC, the budget support instrument of 
the World Bank) than in 52 non-PRSC countries between 2000 and 
2007, 4.2 percent versus 3.0 percent per year. 
With respect to the case studies, many earlier evaluations 
conclude that budget support has some effect on economic growth 
by achieving macro-economic stability or by allowing increased 
government expenditure without increasing the fiscal deficit 
(Dijkstra et al., 2012). This held, for example, in Ghana, Tanzania, 
Mali, and Zambia. According to the IEG evaluation of the PRSC in 
Ghana, the policy dialogue helped to improve the investment 
climate and to abolish energy subsidies, both of which contributed 
to growth (as cited in Dijkstra et al., 2012: 165). In Vietnam and 
       
68 
Nicaragua budget support resources were relatively limited and 
could not impact growth. In Vietnam growth was very high due to 
the government successfully carrying out reforms, but these reforms 
would have been carried out anyway, also without the policy 
dialogue around budget support (Grawe, 2010).  
Writing on Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, Lawson et 
al. (2014) conclude that budget support contributed to growth by 
allowing for increased government expenditure without a need for 
raising taxes or increasing domestic borrowing, so that aggregate 
demand could rise. They add that budget support helped to 
overcome infrastructure bottlenecks by financing investment, and 
that the support to macroeconomic stability helped to improve 
external confidence in the economy. However, they also state that 
budget support’s contribution to growth could have been higher if 
governments had used resources more effectively to address these 
infrastructure constraints, for example in energy supply. 
The Uganda evaluation reports that growth has been high but it 
does not assess the contribution of budget support. In Burkina 
Faso, budget support resources have contributed to the high growth 
rate through enabling macro-economic stability, but the policy 
dialogue has not added much to this financial effect. Donors have 
hardly addressed the lack of effectiveness of public spending in 
general and the inappropriate priorities for public investment, in 
particular. They did give attention to governance issues and 
corruption, perceived as other bottlenecks to growth, but with 
limited success. 
The recent Ghana evaluation concludes that most growth was 
due to other factors such as increased oil income, but it reports some 
modest contributions of budget support, in particular through 
effects on macro-economic stabilisation: cushioning the effects of 
sudden declines in revenues, inducing a new IMF agreement 
through the 2013-2014 suspension, and helping Ghana in setting up 
institutions for responsible oil revenue management. On the other 
hand, the policy dialogue could not maintain government 
commitment to growth-enhancing policies in agriculture, the 
business environment or regarding diversification (Particip, 2017). 
     
 
69 
In Burundi, budget support resources may have contributed to 
growth until 2010 by fostering macro-economic stability. After 
2010, disbursements decreased and the government had to take 
austerity measures, which probably did not help growth. Second, 
budget support’s policy dialogue and the accompanying technical 
assistance have led to some reforms in the investment climate and 
in the coffee sector, but these reforms were insufficient to bring 
about more investment 20  and higher coffee production. So the 
contribution of the policy dialogue to growth was limited.   
Lawson et al. (2016), relying on three studies carried out around 
2008, conclude that budget support made an important contribution 
to the high growth rate in Sierra Leone in the post-war period. It did 
so through increasing aggregate demand, raising confidence among 
domestic and foreign investors, and financing salaries of public 
service providers. In the more recent period, budget support most 
likely helped growth by maintaining macro-economic stability in the 
crisis years 2009 and 2014, and by financing an expansion of the 
road network. 
Orth et al. (2017) conclude that there is a positive effect of 
budget support resources on reinforcing macroeconomic stability, 
and through this, on economic growth. This is certainly also the 
common finding in the more recent country evaluations discussed 
above. It can be added that in the two post-conflict countries 
Burundi and Sierra Leone budget support helped to achieve (and not 
reinforce) macro-economic stability. Orth et al. (2017) do not find 
sufficient evidence for an effect of the policy dialogue on macro-
economic stabilisation or growth. The very diverse experiences 
discussed above confirm this. While in some countries (Ghana in 
the earlier years, to some extent Burkina Faso) the policy dialogue 
helped to improve the investment climate, in other countries 
opportunities were missed or the dialogue was not effective. 
All in all, budget support contributes to growth but mainly 
through its resources and mainly through its effect on macro-
economic stabilisation. This can also partly be explained by the fact 
that the Poverty Reduction Strategies on which budget support was 
                                                 
20 Lack of respect for rule of law and high taxes were main investment barriers. 
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based, hardly paid attention to growth (IEO, 2004; OED, 2004). In 
so far as they addressed growth, they mentioned macro-economic 
stabilisation and market liberalisation. The strategies, often 
elaborated in order to access debt relief and with little ownership, 
reflected the continued dominance of the Washington Consensus 
(Craig & Porter, 2003; Stewart & Wang, 2003). Later strategies gave 
some more attention to economic growth, but this usually meant a 
somewhat higher priority for physical infrastructure. Other than 
this, growth policies did not become very concrete (Canagarajah & 
Diesen, 2006; Woll, 2008). According to some more critical voices, 
budget support has maintained the conditionality in favour of 
market liberalisation and in particular, trade liberalisation. As a 
result, the likely effect of budget support is more negative than 
positive for economic growth (Langan, 2015) Knoll, 2008.   
4.2 Income poverty 
IEG (2010) compares countries with a PRSC with countries without 
this aid modality. In PRSC countries the poverty headcount 
(percentage of population living in poverty) proved to have reduced 
by 8 percentage points between 1999 and 2005, while in non-PRSC 
countries this was 5 percentage points. Dijkstra et al. (2012: 173) 
carried out the same analysis for countries with and without budget 
support, and show that countries with budget support have a 
significantly larger reduction in the poverty headcount between 
2000 and 2007: 11 percentage points versus 6 percentage points 
(with poverty measured as living on less than $1.25 per day). 
However, the value of these simple with-without comparisons is 
limited as they do not control for other factors influencing poverty 
reduction, or for possible endogeneity: countries may receive a 
PRSC or budget support because they carry out good and/or 
successful poverty reduction policies.21 
The first joint evaluation of budget support could not conclude 
on the effect of budget support on the reduction of income poverty 
due to lack of sufficient data, the short time period of budget 
                                                 
21 The reverse is also possible: Countries receive budget support because they 
have more difficulties with reducing poverty.  
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support provision, and methodological problems (IDD and 
Associates, 2006). In the six case studies presented in the IOB study, 
the contribution of budget support was assessed but the results 
varied. In Vietnam and Mali income poverty decreased most, but 
there was little relationship with budget support. High growth rates 
were important, but also the fact growth happened to be in the 
cotton sector leading to rural income increases (Mali) and that the 
government carried out pro-poor and pro-rural policies, providing 
the rural population access to education and infrastructure 
(Vietnam). High economic growth in Zambia and Tanzania hardly 
led to reductions in poverty, mainly due to the fact that the rural 
poor did not benefit from this growth. In Zambia, donors had tried 
in vain to make agricultural policies more pro-poor, as also 
discussed above. In Nicaragua rural poverty decreased in the period 
of budget support as a result of high coffee prices and probably also 
of social protection programmes set up by the Ortega government 
– in the latter, there may be an effect of budget support resources 
but not of the policy dialogue. 
As to the more recent evaluations, the evaluation on 
Mozambique reports no change in the percentage of the population 
living below the poverty line between 2003 and 2009, despite high 
average annual growth rates of 7 percent. This is the more striking 
given that agricultural growth was high as well. The evaluators 
explain this discrepancy by pointing to data problems, in particular 
regarding the poverty surveys. In addition, high growth, also in 
agriculture, may have been driven by some large investment projects 
that do not benefit the poor (ITAD 2014: 150). For Burundi poverty 
data is only available for one year so no conclusions can be drawn. 
In Uganda income poverty levels have fallen, but the evaluation 
does not assess the contribution of budget support. For Uganda this 
is a bit disappointing as the government began to prioritise growth 
and the productive sector since the early and mid-2000s, and most 
likely budget support resources have facilitated these investments. 
In Ghana, budget support contributed to a further reduction in 
income poverty, in particular during the first part of the evaluation 
period. This was accomplished through improving access to basic 
services and through the attention in the policy dialogue for 
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maintaining pro-poor interventions. The evaluation of Burkina Faso 
notes that although budget support contributed to growth, there 
was a limited impact on poverty reduction as there was not much 
attention for sectors that could have led to pro-poor growth 
(Particip, 2016: x, see also above). Orth et al. (2017) conclude that 
the effects of budget support on income poverty reduction are not 
consistent, which is in line with the huge variation reported in the 
evaluations discussed above. 
All in all, the studies show that if budget support contributed to 
the reduction of income poverty, it was most likely through its effect 
on economic growth. However, growth proved by no means 
sufficient for reducing income poverty, as testified by the 
experiences of Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. 
The limited results of budget support for income poverty reduction 
can also be explained by the fact that budget support has supported 
the countries’ Poverty Reduction Strategies. These strategies not 
only paid limited attention to growth, but were very much targeted 
to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Although the first MDG contains a target on income poverty 
reduction, the attention in the Poverty Reduction Strategies has 
been on the MDGs related to non-income poverty, in particular in 
the areas of (gendered) education, (gendered) health, and water and 
sanitation. As a result, the budget support policy dialogue also 
focused on achieving targets related to non-income poverty. 
4.3 Non-income poverty 
Chapter 2 of this report already concluded that expenditure for 
priority sectors as defined in the Poverty Reduction Strategies 
increased in almost all countries. This section examines what this 
has meant for the access to social services and for final outcomes 
with respect to social services. I begin by presenting the results of 
some quantitative cross-country studies.  
Several studies have examined differences between countries 
receiving budget support and countries not receiving that support, 
in the achievement of the MDGs. Beynon & Dusu (2010) found 
that access to primary education and to water and sanitation 
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improved more in countries with budget support. In addition, the 
gender equality in access to primary education improved more and 
infant and child mortality rates decreased more. IEG (2010) found 
the same for countries with and without a PRSC. However, in 
countries without a PRSC the increase in access to secondary 
education was higher than in PRSC countries. This could be 
explained by the higher priority budget support donors usually gave 
to primary education rather than secondary education. 
Dijkstra et al. (2012) show that countries with budget support 
have a slightly higher improvement in the Human Development 
Index (HDI) between 2000 and 2011. A regression analysis that 
controls for other factors such as economic growth, improvements 
in governance, other aid and whether the country benefited from 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Country initiative, confirms a significant 
effect of budget support on an improvement in the HDI.22  
Dijkstra et al. (2012: 193) carried out a similar multivariate 
regression analysis in order to assess the effect of budget support 
on several social indicators. They present separate results for 
including and excluding other aid as regressor; probably the actual 
effect is underestimated if other aid is included, and vice versa. They 
also present results when budget support is instrumented for. There 
prove to be robust positive effects on access to primary education, 
number of teachers in both primary and secondary education, and 
share of well-educated teachers in primary education. In health, the 
only robust outcome is an increase in the share of deliveries 
attended by skilled staff, and in immunisation rates – but the latter 
only if other aid is excluded. 
The earlier case study evaluations conclude that budget support 
allowed an expansion of services in, for example, health and 
education, but that the contribution of budget support to improved 
social indicators was difficult to assess due to lack of data and 
attribution problems (IDD and associates, 2006). They also 
conclude that the expansion was often accompanied by a 
deterioration in the quality, for example in education. 
                                                 
22 Growth was the only other significant factor.  
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Orth et al. (2017) also conclude that budget support has not been 
effective in improving the quality of service delivery or the 
administration of the services. However, although quality is indeed 
low, there is not much proof that quality decreased. In primary 
education, for example, student-teacher ratios and student-
classroom ratios have often improved. This was the case, for 
example, in Uganda and Zambia (Dijkstra et al., 2012). Student-
teacher ratios also improved in Tanzania, at least in the latter years 
of the evaluation period (Itad, 2013: 98). In Mozambique, student-
teacher ratios improved while student-textbook ratios decreased 
(Itad, 2014: 169, 171). In Mali, student-teacher ratios and textbook-
student ratios both improved (ECO consult, 2011). Furthermore, 
lower exam pass rates or completion rates may be the result of the 
fact that children from poorer families, of whom the parents never 
had access to education, now attend primary school (Dijkstra et al., 
2012, Lawson et al., 2014). In Mozambique, poverty proved to be 
an important hindrance for completing primary school (Itad, 2014). 
All in all, this means that budget support resources have often 
helped to lower student-teacher ratios, student-class room ratios or 
student- text book ratios, thus contributing to the quality.  
The case studies included in Dijkstra et al (2012) vary in their 
conclusions on the contribution of budget support to higher access 
to services and to improved social indicators. Most of the (huge) 
improvements in social indicators in Vietnam, for example, are due 
to government policies and not to budget support. The newer 
evaluations are, in general, more positive. And all of them use 
econometric analysis in order to establish causal relations between 
specific government investments, facilitated by budget support 
resources, and i) improved access and ii) improved final outcomes. 
The results for education and health are presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Contribution of budget support to access and final outcomes in education and health in recently 
evaluated countries 
 Education access  Health access  Education 
outcomes 
Health outcomes 
 trend BS trend BS trend BS trend BS 
Mali 03-09 + Yes + Yes + Yes + Yes 
Zambia 05-10 + Yes + Yes + Yes + Yes 
Tanzania 04-11 + Yes NA NA + Yes NA NA 
Mozambique 05-12 + Yes NA NA + Yes NA NA 
Uganda 04-13 + Yes* + Yes* 0 0 0 0 
Sierra Leone 02-13 + Yes + Yes + Yes + Yes 
Burundi 05-13 +*** Yes*** +*** Yes*** - Yes*** NA NA 
Burkina Faso 09-14 NA NA + Yes NA NA + Yes 
Ghana 05-15 NA NA + Yes** NA NA + Yes** 
Legend: 
BS: Lists whether there was a positive contribution of budget support to the indicator(s), “yes”, “0”= neutral, or “No” 
Trend: + (or -):  Positive (negative) trend for at least one indicator and no information on other indicators, or positive (negative) result for majority of indicators; 
0: neutral result, or positive result for one indicator and negative result for another 
NA: No information in report 
*Mainly in first half of evaluation period. 
**Until 2012. 
***Until around 2010. 
Sources: country evaluations. 
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In Mali, the higher budgets for health and education facilitated by 
(general and sector) budget support led to large improvements in 
education and health outcomes between 2002 and 2009. The 
primary enrolment rate, for example, increased from 64 to 81 
percent and the primary completion rate increased from 40 to 56 
percent (Eco consult, 2011).  Similarly, in Zambia, the higher 
budgets for the social sectors led to increases in staff for health and 
education, to more classrooms and more availability of essential 
drugs. Statistical analyses show that these investments were effective 
in improving immunisation rates, child and maternal mortality rates, 
reducing the prevalence of illnesses such as malaria, tuberculosis and 
diarrhoea, and increasing enrolment and completion rates (De 
Kemp et al., 2011).      
The evaluation in Tanzania focuses on education and agriculture, 
but in the latter no econometric analysis was possible due to data 
constraints. Budget support resources facilitated higher expenditure 
for the priority sectors and most of this went to education. This led 
to huge increases in access to primary and secondary education. In 
recent years, exam pass ratios in primary education have also 
increased, and the lower pupil-teacher ratio to which budget support 
contributed is a main factor behind this result. Yet, this result is 
considered fragile and more investment in quality is necessary (Itad, 
2013).  In Mozambique, budget support resources contributed to 
large increases in primary enrolment (by 40 percent) and in 
secondary enrolment (by 65 percent, although starting from a very 
low base).23 Children from poorer households, in particular, could 
benefit from increased access, and the gap between boys’ and girls’ 
enrolment decreased to 4 percentage point (Itad, 2014). In addition, 
gross completion rates in primary education increased dramatically. 
Budget support contributed to this result, for example through 
lowering the student-teacher ratio.  
The Uganda evaluation focuses on results in education, health 
and in water and sanitation. In education, budget support resources 
facilitated large increases in both primary and secondary enrolment, 
in particular in the first half of the evaluation period. The budget 
                                                 
23 In 2008, secondary enrolment was still at only 17.3 percent. 
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support dialogue helped to achieve gender parity in gross primary 
enrolment, but did little to prevent relatively high female dropouts 
or to improve the quality of education. Access to health services 
increased as a result of public investment in the sector, partly 
financed by budget support, but inequality between urban and rural 
areas remained. The policy dialogue had some effect on health 
policies, and budget support resources facilitated some government 
initiatives, such as the abolishment of user fees. However, maternal 
mortality rates declined only slowly and recent trends in some 
indicators, for example in female HIV infection rates, are a reason 
for concern. The water and sanitation sector had a successful Sector-
wide approach financed by sector budget support and other aid. It 
led to increased access to water in rural areas and in small towns. 
Budget support facilitated these outcomes by resources and policy 
dialogue (IEG and Particip, 2015). All in all, results are better in 
water and sanitation than in health and education. The latter sectors 
undoubtedly suffered from the changed priorities of the Uganda 
government. As shown in chapter 2, budget support could not 
prevent that spending for the priority sectors stagnated. 
In Sierra Leone, budget support helped to increase primary and 
secondary enrolment rates, while also contributing to increases in 
exam pass rates at all levels. In 2014, female and male primary 
enrolment rates had become equal. Budget support also contributed 
to improvements in access to health services, in nutrition and in 
maternal mortality rates (Lawson et al., 2016). 
In Burundi, budget support contributed to an expansion of 
services in health and education, at least until around 2010. For 
health, this conclusion is just based on qualitative analysis. In 
education, a common donor fund to support this sector also played 
a role. The enrolment rates in primary and secondary education 
increased dramatically, at least until 2009-10. Econometric analysis 
shows that there was a contribution from budget support through 
more infrastructure, more staff and by offering school meals. 
Repetition and drop-out rates in education are still high, however, 
and pass rates have declined. The number of teachers proved to be 
the most important factor on the supply side, and budget support 
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contributed to its increase – although it was not sufficient yet (ADE, 
2015).  
In Burkina Faso, budget support contributed to improved access 
to health services, leading to improvements in some outcome 
indicators such as the maternal mortality rate and the prevalence of 
underweight among children. There was more access to water in 
urban areas and more attention for sanitation, but access to water in 
rural areas lagged behind. A big problem in this country is the lack 
of effectiveness of public spending, for example reflected in under-
execution of investment budgets. The budget support dialogue was 
not effective in addressing these problems (Particip GmbH, 2016: 
24-27).  
The Ghana evaluation focuses on three sectors: health, energy 
and natural resources, and agriculture, and these sectors received 
substantial sector budget support as well. In health budget support 
contributed to better policy-making and monitoring and evaluation, 
and also to improved health coverage and outcomes, in particular 
through financing more health staff. But these positive results were 
only visible until around 2012. In the energy and natural resources 
sector budget support facilitated an improved legal framework and 
helped strengthening relevant agencies. However, this did not 
improve actual policy implementation and there is evidence of a 
further deterioration of the environment: pollution, in particular of 
water, increases, and the resource base decreases. Budget support 
facilitated the setting up of relevant programmes with the Ministry 
of Agriculture in order to stimulate non-cocoa agricultural 
production, but these suffered from implementation problems 
(Particip GmbH, 2017). 
The ending of Dutch budget support in Burkina Faso, Nicaragua, 
Tanzania and  Zambia is estimated to have had negative effects on 
service delivery and outcomes in health and education (De Kemp 
and Lobbrecht, 2016). The people living in more deprived regions 
often suffered most from the lower investments in the sectors.  
Overviewing the evidence from the recent evaluations, we can 
conclude that budget support contributed in all countries where this 
was examined to increased access in health and education (Table 5 
above). The evidence for a contribution of budget support to final 
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outcomes in education and health is also quite strong. Some of these 
positive conclusions are only valid for a certain period, which is 
related to the declining volumes of budget support in recent years. 
Almost all of these conclusions from evaluations are based on 
econometric analysis within the respective sectors. Combined with 
the cross-country quantitative evidence showing positive 
contributions of budget support on improvements in the HDI and 
in some important social indicators the overall conclusion is that 
budget support indeed contributed to the reduction in non-income 
poverty. The main channel for this positive outcome has been the 
increase in resources, and in several of the reviewed studies this 
increase comes from both general and sector budget support. On 
the other hand, many studies conclude that the policy dialogue 
around budget support has done little to improve the efficiency or 
quality of service delivery (IEG, 2010; Dijkstra et al. 2012; Lawson 
et al., 2014; ADE, 2015).    
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Chapter 5. Conclusions 
Budget support is considered the preferred instrument for 
increasing aid effectiveness. Based on the expected advantages of 
respect for ownership, harmonisation, alignment, and predictability, 
budget support was considered to be the most effective aid modality 
for achieving poverty reduction. In practice however, donors began 
to use this instrument for improving governance, and in particular 
political governance. This report has reviewed the evidence on the 
effectiveness of budget support, taking into account these two goals. 
It has followed the policy theory of budget support, tracing the 
effects of the two inputs, resources and donor preferences for the 
policy dialogue, via the throughputs respect for ownership, 
harmonisation, alignment and predictability, and the outputs lower 
transaction costs, enhanced macro-economic stability, increased 
government spending for priority sectors, systemic effects on PFM 
and domestic accountability, and improved policies and governance, 
to the ultimate outcomes economic growth, income and non-
income poverty reduction, and, again, improved governance in all 
its aspects.  
The review builds on the earlier comprehensive IOB evaluation 
of budget support and adds more recent sources including country 
evaluations, syntheses of those evaluations, reviews and academic 
literature. The conclusions prove to be more or less in line with the 
earlier study, yet the negative consequences of donors giving ever 
more priority to the added objective of improving governance have 
become more evident. This chapter first summarises the findings. 
This is followed by a discussion and finally by some policy 
implications. 
5.1 Summary of findings 
On average, budget support constituted between 14 and 28 
percent of total ODA in the recently evaluated countries. This led 
to substantial alignment of aid to local systems. Although some 
donors maintained separate variable tranches, in most countries 
disbursement conditions were to a very large extent harmonised. 
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The between-year predictability of budget support was good, and 
better than for project aid. Within-year predictability remained 
somewhat problematic, with donors disbursing later than promised 
and most flows coming at the end of the year. Budget support has 
decreased transaction costs. However, all these positive findings 
held mostly for the earlier parts of the evaluation periods.24 The 
benefits largely evaporated as a result of more intensive governance 
discussions, varying responses of donors to perceived breaks with 
Underlying Principles, and lower volumes of budget support.  
Donors applied limited selectivity when starting budget support, 
in particular with respect to governance. And donors had difficulties 
in respecting ownership. Once budget support started, they began 
to use the policy dialogue to influence policies and, increasingly, 
governance. This lack of respect for ownership seems to have 
increased over time. In many countries the policy dialogue 
deteriorated as a result of a vicious circle: increasing donor 
dissatisfaction with country performance, often on governance 
issues, led to ever higher ambitions for the policy dialogue, in turn 
causing more dissatisfaction. In the end, it led to suspensions and 
withdrawals, with each donor country making its own decisions on 
these matters, thus reducing harmonisation. The dominance of the 
governance objective not only made ownership a foul, but also 
affected the other benefits of budget support, namely 
harmonisation, alignment and predictability.  
If donors succeeded in coordinating their preferences for the 
policy dialogue and jointly agreed on a small number of indicators 
for the PAF, positive systemic effects of the dialogue were possible 
on better coordination and higher results-orientation of national 
policies. The combination of the use of domestic systems, attention 
in the policy dialogue, and technical assistance led to improvements 
in Public Financial Management. The systemic effects of budget 
support on increasing domestic accountability seem to be limited. 
The policy dialogue is between donors and executive, and the use of 
local systems and budgets did not automatically generate interest 
among parliament or civil society actors. Yet, the policy dialogue 
                                                 
24 Turning point varies between countries but lies somewhere between 2005 
(Uganda and Ethiopia) and 2011 (Burkina Faso). 
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and accompanying capacity building activities did lead to 
improvements in the institutions for horizontal accountability (the 
supply side). It contributed to increasing transparency of budgets 
and of budget execution, in particular through strengthening Public 
Accounts Committees of Parliaments, Supreme Audit Institutions 
or Courts of Audit. Direct donor support to institutions on the 
demand side of accountability was more limited. Yet in several 
countries parliaments, media and/or civil society have grasped the 
increased opportunities to hold governments to account, implying 
that budget support also contributed somewhat to improvements in 
vertical accountability. Budget support not only strengthened 
institutions for the oversight of budget execution but also other 
institutions meant to monitor corruption. This contributed to more 
detection of corruption. However, in most countries concerns 
remain on the extent of prosecution and punishment of the culprits. 
Contrary to the many expectations on the high fiduciary risks of 
budget support, there is no evidence that it increased corruption.  
In line with earlier literature on structural adjustment, the 
effectiveness of donor attempts to influence policies, governance 
and human rights was limited. With respect to policies, the 
evaluations point to some missed opportunities. Donors were often 
focused too much on too many individual performance indicators, 
at the cost of a more strategic discussion on how obstacles in public 
service provision could be removed or economic growth could be 
fostered. Donors were also hindered by a lack of knowledge on how 
budget support or government policies would be able to reduce 
income poverty. However, where donors tried to make policies 
more pro-poor in areas where this conflicted with (perceived) 
strategic or political interest of the recipient government 
(Mozambique, Zambia), they were not successful. In the area of 
governance and human rights, it is clear that hard incentives, such 
as indicators in the PAF or (threats of) suspensions were at most 
able to lead to cosmetic changes. Soft incentives appear to have 
worked better. Some authors argue that donors would achieve more 
in the governance area if they manage to speak with one voice, but 
the evidence for this is not strong. 
Budget support has contributed to achieving, or, depending on 
the situation in the recipient country, maintaining macro-economic 
     
 
83 
stability. Budget support allowed countries to increase government 
expenditure without affecting macro-economic stability, and thus 
contributed to economic growth. In most countries, spending for 
the priority sectors as defined in the Poverty Reduction Strategies 
increased. On average, there is no evidence of budget support 
decreasing domestic tax revenues. However, there are large 
differences between countries, with worrying trends in some 
recently evaluated countries (Burundi, Sierra Leone and Uganda). 
Countries with budget support have experienced more reduction 
in income poverty than other developing countries, but this does 
not prove a causal relationship yet. From the country evaluations, it 
can be concluded that if budget support contributed to a reduction 
in income poverty, it was most likely through its effect on economic 
growth. However, growth proved by no means a sufficient 
condition for reducing income poverty, as testified by the 
experiences of Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia 
where income poverty hardly decreased. 
Budget support did contribute to the reduction in non-income 
poverty. Budget support resources, and sometimes the dialogue as 
well, have facilitated more expenditure for the priority sectors. This 
has led to more class rooms, more drug availability, and more staff 
for education and health. In turn, this has contributed to higher 
school enrolment rates, to more gender equality in access to primary 
education, to more access to health services, and more access to 
water and sanitation. In some countries, access to secondary 
education significantly improved as well. In many countries there 
were also improvements in outcomes such as primary school 
completion rates, immunisation rates, infant and child mortality 
rates, and maternal mortality rates. The contribution of budget 
support to these achievements has been shown both in quantitative 
cross-country analysis and in case studies, with the more recent 
country evaluations applying rigorous methods for establishing the 
causal relation between increased investment facilitated by budget 
support, and ultimate social outcomes. 
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5.2 Discussion 
Two clear findings stand out. One is that budget support, and 
particularly its resources, have contributed to economic growth and 
to the reduction of non-income poverty, while having much less 
effect and at most an indirect one (through economic growth) on 
income poverty reduction. The other is that donors have 
increasingly attempted to use budget support as instrument for 
improving governance, in particular for fostering democracy, 
human rights, and anti-corruption actions. However, these efforts 
have not been very effective, and there appears to be a trade-off 
between the two objectives. In the following, I first explain the two 
main findings and then discuss the trade-off. In the part of this 
section, I discuss the fall in budget support volumes in recent years. 
5.2.1 Poverty reduction 
The achievement of substantial improvements in social indicators 
means that budget support has been quite effective in meeting its 
original objective, at least the non-income part of poverty reduction. 
This is a huge accomplishment. To a large extent, it can be attributed 
to the high degree of alignment of policy priorities between donors 
and recipient countries in the years 2000s and beyond. The universal 
agreement on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) played 
an important role.  Budget support resources helped to carry out the 
recipient countries’ Poverty Reduction Strategies, which were often 
targeted to these MDGs. This favoured policies and spending 
decisions targeted to increased access to social services, and hence 
enabled these positive outcomes.   
The limited (direct) results of budget support for income poverty 
reduction can be attributed to two factors. First, although the first 
MDG contains a target on income poverty reduction, the emphasis 
in the Poverty Reduction Strategies that were supported by budget 
support was on the MDGs related to non-income poverty, in 
particular in the areas of (gendered) education, (gendered) health, 
and water and sanitation. Resources were therefore mainly invested 
in sectors like health, education and water. These investments 
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potentially have medium or long term effects on income poverty but 
as yet, these effects can hardly be visible. 
Second, neither the policy theory of budget support nor the 
Poverty Reduction Strategies were explicit on how government 
policies or resources would reduce income poverty. In this light, the 
expectations on budget support’s contribution to reducing income 
poverty were far too high. To the extent that resources can play a 
direct role in reducing income poverty, this is through social safety 
net or cash transfer programmes. However, in the early 2000s, 
knowledge of and experience with these type of programmes was 
still limited and they were seldom included in Poverty Reduction 
Strategies. In order to reduce income poverty in a more structural 
way, government policies such as tax and subsidy policies but also 
policies that affect the distribution of assets (land) in a country and 
that intervene in the production structure, are probably more 
important than government resources.  
Similar explanations hold for the fact that the main contribution 
of budget support to growth was through its effect on macro-
economic stabilisation. The Poverty Reduction Strategies hardly 
paid attention to growth. In so far as they did, they stressed macro-
economic stabilisation and market liberalisation, and in later years 
some also mentioned the importance of physical infrastructure. 
Some country evaluations report a contribution of budget support 
to growth through helping to finance infrastructure. But to the 
extent that the policy dialogue around budget support pushed for 
market liberalisation, and to the extent it was successful, it may have 
negatively influenced growth.  
5.2.2 Governance 
Regarding the second important finding, the question is why the 
objective of improving political governance got so much 
prominence, despite already existing evidence of limited 
effectiveness of conditionality. In fact, two issues require an 
explanation. First, the fact that policy conditionality entered the 
policy dialogue almost from the start, and second the fact that 
governance, and in particular corruption issues and issues related to 
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free and fair elections and human rights took centre stage, and 
ultimately led to suspensions and withdrawals of budget support by 
many donors, and in particular bilateral donors. 
With respect to the first, and as already discussed in Chapter 1, 
many authors have already pointed to the “schizophrenia” in the aid 
industry at the time when all donors and recipient embraced the 
Paris Declaration. While the official discourse was that aid was 
ineffective due to conditionality and lack of ownership, many actors 
in the aid community were of the view that the real reason for aid’s 
ineffectiveness were inadequate policies and governance in recipient 
countries (Renard, 2007; Rogerson, 2005). Secondly, chapter 2 
shows that donors applied very little selectivity in the budget 
support allocation. They defined eligibility criteria and/or 
underlying principles, but in an opaque way and many of these 
criteria and principles were not met at the start. This situation 
reinforced the latent doubts on, and lack of trust in, governance of 
recipient governments. This also induced the reintroduction of 
conditionality. A third explanation is more theoretical and in that 
sense complementary to the other two. Wolff (2015) argues that 
technocratic, New-Public-Management-like instruments are often 
selected before there is normative consensus about objectives. 
Budget support can be seen as such as technocratic, de-politicised 
instrument. This would explain that once in place, the other – 
hidden – objective, that of influencing policies and governance, 
quickly came to the surface. 
The increasing importance of, and lack of tolerance for, issues 
like corruption, infringements of democratic practices and human 
rights violations has to do, on the one hand, with developments in 
the recipient countries, and on the other, with changes in the donor 
countries. There were problems with the elections and treatment of 
the opposition in Ethiopia (2005), Uganda and Nicaragua (2008) 
and Mozambique (2009); in many other countries corruption 
scandals appeared (again) around 2007 or in the years after that. But 
concerns on electoral processes were not new or unexpected, and 
most likely, budget support has contributed to corruption coming 
into the open, through its support to improved budget systems and 
domestic accountability institutions. 
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Probably the developments within the donor countries were 
more important for the critical responses to these issues. The 
circumstances were slightly different in different countries, but the 
global economic crisis in 2008 made all donor governments more 
critical of development cooperation in general. This implied that 
donors came to see budget support as a more political instrument 
(than other aid modalities) for which the eligibility criteria really had 
to be met. In addition, in many European countries more 
conservative governments were elected, also contributing to a more 
critical stance toward budget support. In Sweden, for example, the 
liberal/conservative government that took office after the elections 
in 2006 sharpened the eligibility criteria for budget support in 2008, 
putting a much greater emphasis on human rights and democracy 
(Larsson, 2018). The conservative government that took power in 
the UK in 2010 also began to apply much stricter conditionality on 
governance, in particular accountability systems (Koch & 
Molenaers, 2016). Germany temporarily suspended budget support 
globally in 2008 in order to investigate the fiduciary risks of the 
instrument. In the Netherlands, political governance was at the heart 
of the critical debates in parliament on budget support in around the 
same year (Dijkstra et al., 2012). Wolff (2015) sees the European 
Commission as champion of the technocratic instrument of budget 
support, and argues that this induced an ever more critical and 
politicised stance in the member states. Ultimately, this also 
influenced the budget support policy of the EU itself. In 2011, and 
after strong pressures from several member states (the UK, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Nordic countries) the EU began to 
apply much stricter criteria with respect to democracy and human 
rights issues (Koch and Molenaers, 2016).  
5.2.3 The trade-off 
Given the results obtained in the reduction of (non-income) 
poverty, there is a clear trade-off between the two objectives of 
budget support. If donors gave priority to fostering political 
governance and this led to reducing or ending budget support, the 
poverty reduction objective could no longer be achieved. In turn, 
prioritizing poverty reduction required donors to not use budget 
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support for promoting governance. This shows that the “Tinbergen 
rule” holds (Tinbergen, 1952): the number of instruments should be 
equal to the number of objectives. In this case it implies that one 
instrument (budget support) can only have one objective.  
This trade-off has already been highlighted in previous studies. 
Some authors analyse the trade-off in a neutral way, analysing which 
stand the EU takes, for example (Del Biondo & Orbie, 2014). 
Others are more outspoken. The addition of the objective of 
improving governance not only reduced ownership, but also led to 
uncoordinated actions of donors to delay or suspend disbursements. 
It severely reduced alignment, harmonisation, and predictability and 
thus reduced the resources available for poverty reduction (Dijkstra 
et al., 2012; Dijkstra, 2013; Molenaers, 2012; Molenaers et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, the use of the policy dialogue for governance issues 
and not for policies, limited donor influence on poverty policies 
(Dijkstra, 2013; Lawson et al., 2014). 
Faust et el. (2012) draw another conclusion from the observation 
that there is a trade-off between the two objectives. They argue that 
donors in Zambia gave different priorities to the objective of 
improving democratic accountability, and that this led to incoherent 
signals to the government. They conclude that if donors would all 
have the same goal hierarchy, i.e. give preference to improving 
democratic governance over poverty reduction, progress in 
democratisation would be possible. However, given the limited 
results in the promotion of political good governance in general, this 
can be questioned.  
5.2.4 The decline of budget support 
In recent years, several donors have stopped providing budget 
support altogether, and others, like the European Commission and 
the UK, maintain much stricter governance criteria. Donors 
continuing budget support as before included the World Bank and 
other multilateral development banks. Yet, overall volumes have 
declined substantially (Figure 1). It is clear that the declining interest 
for budget support among, in particular, bilateral donors does not 
have any relationship with the evidence. Budget support has 
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contributed greatly to the advancement of the Millennium 
Development Goals, while the (assumed) fiduciary risks proved to 
be limited. To the contrary, budget support helped to improve 
public financial management systems and domestic accountability 
institutions. 
One of the reasons for the declining volumes of budget support 
was the fact that political governance had become a second 
objective for budget support and the resulting disenchantment 
when this objective was not achieved. But there are other factors as 
well, like the earlier mentioned economic crisis of 2008 and the fact 
that in many donor countries more conservative governments were 
elected. These governments are in general less committed to the aid 
effectiveness agenda and more to an agenda that promotes domestic 
strategic or commercial interests. Faust and Koch (2014) show 
econometrically for 15 European donors that lower growth rates 
and more conservative governments have a more negative effect on 
budget support volumes than on aid volumes in general (Faust & 
Koch, 2014).  
Furthermore, it seems that citizens in donor countries have 
become more critical toward development cooperation in general. 
According to surveys, more than half of the people in France, the 
UK, and the US think that most aid is wasted and ends up in the 
hands of corrupt officials. 25  Against this background, providing 
budget support is harder to justify than project aid, and brings 
political risks for governments in donor countries. The more critical 
stance toward development cooperation in general also brings about 
a need for donor governments to show visible results of aid. This is 
perceived to be more difficult with budget support: while positive 
effects of budget support can be shown, it is not easy to attribute 
them to an individual donor. The effects always are the joined results 
of the collective of donors and of the actions of recipient 
governments. 
In line with this, Koch et al. (2017) argue that collective action 
problems of donors are the main factor behind the reduced interest 
in budget support. The joint nature of programme-based 
                                                 
25 As reported in Kenny (2017). 
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approaches (general and sector budget support, sector-wide 
approaches) gives donors an incentive to free-ride on the financial 
and technical contributions of other donors. Whilst there are 
certainly benefits for individual donors – by having a seat on the 
table they can push for their own political or sector agendas, - the 
main benefits and also the potential political costs (fiduciary and 
other risks) will accrue to all participating donors (Koch, Leiderer, 
Faust, & Molenaers, 2017). However, according to this reasoning, 
rational donors would maintain some budget support or sector 
budget support in all countries in which they are active, in order to 
reap the individual benefits without incurring high costs. This is not 
what we see in practice. Nevertheless, the lack of visibility of 
individual donor efforts can provide part of the explanation for the 
decrease in budget support.  
All in all, the most important explanations include the more 
critical stance of citizens toward development cooperation that 
reinforced the perceived risks of budget support and increased the 
need for visibility of results, the rise of conservative governments, 
and the disenchantment with the results on the second objective of 
budget support, namely that of improving democracy and human 
rights. 
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Chapter 6. Policy recommendations 
Budget support continues to be the most effective instrument for 
fostering growth and poverty reduction. The advantages of budget 
support as compared to project aid still hold. And in the current 
context of declining growth rates and government revenues in 
Africa, budget support can be particularly helpful to sustain 
government expenditure, in particular for the social sectors, without 
endangering macro-economic stability. 
The question is how donors can build on the positive outcomes 
of budget support, while also taking into account the political 
backlash of budget support within their own countries. The latter 
holds, in particular, for bilateral donors. In the following, I first 
sketch the conditions for choosing this modality, also in comparison 
with other aid modalities, and then I give some recommendations 
on the use and the design of the instrument. 
6.1 Conditions 
A first condition is that there must be a minimum degree of 
consensus between donor and recipient on socio-economic policies 
in the recipient country. In the years 2000s, this agreement was 
guaranteed by the joint focus on the MDGs. These goals have now 
been followed up by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
that are also universally agreed upon. There is no a priori reason why 
there cannot be a broad consensus again on a recipient country’s 
development goals. 
Second, budget support requires some level of trust in the 
governance of the recipient. It makes sense for donors to assess the 
governance situation in a country before providing aid.26 Some trust 
in political governance, so the extent of democracy and respect for 
human rights, is important for all aid channelled to governments, 
not just for budget support. For budget support in particular, a basic 
                                                 
26 This does not need to apply in fragile states but fragile states are not included 
in this report. 
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confidence in budgeting and public financial accountability systems 
(the more technocratic aspects of governance) is also important. But 
given the opportunities to improve these systems through budget 
support, this can be a dynamic assessment: a willingness to improve, 
or evidence of actual improvements in the recent past, are more 
important than the level of these systems.27  
In practice, donors may consider a portfolio approach with 
regard to aid modalities to a particular recipient. If donors do not 
have trust in the recipient government’s respect for democratic 
values and human rights, they may consider providing aid to non-
governmental organisations or not providing aid to the country at 
all. In case they decide to allocate aid to governments, general or 
sector budget support is in principle more effective than project aid 
for most aid objectives. In both cases, resources flow to the 
accounts of the Ministry of Finance, so the policy dialogue and 
(eventual) accompanying capacity building activities can focus on 
improving budgeting, reporting and auditing systems. General 
budget support is more suitable for dealing with strategic and cross-
cutting issues related to poverty reduction. Sector budget support 
can focus in more detail on policies for a particular sector.28  
In a way, recipient countries can also apply a portfolio approach. 
Although it is in the interest of the recipient government to have a 
substantial flow of resources through budget support, it is not 
necessary that “all” donors participate in general budget support. To 
the contrary, when donor groups are smaller budget support proves 
to be more predictable as there are fewer suspensions (Molenaers et 
al., 2015). In addition, the quality of the policy dialogue proves to 
be better (Lawson et al., 2014). It may be sensible for a recipient 
country to prefer receiving general budget support from multilateral 
donors, and sector budget support from different groups of bilateral 
donors. Multilateral donors are less influenced by political concerns 
and are better able to secure predictable funding. It would mean that 
both policy dialogues can focus on policies instead of on politics 
and governance. And although the partial substitution of general 
                                                 
27 When budget support to Vietnam started, the public budget comprised just 
one page. 
28 See also Lawson et al. (2014: 82). 
     
 
93 
budget support by sector budget support would imply less donor 
harmonization at the central government level, resources would still 
be aligned to government systems and aid predictability would 
probably increase. 
6.2 The use and design of budget support 
When donors have a basic trust in a country’s governance and begin 
to provide budget support, they should refrain from using budget 
support as leverage for improving political governance. The 
performance assessment matrix (PAF) should not include targets on 
political governance issues. The evidence shows that attempts to 
influence democracy and human rights can at most have formal or 
symbolic effects and do not bring about substantive changes. On 
the other hand, frequent (threats of) suspensions for governance 
reasons hamper the advantages of budget support, in particular the 
predictability of funding, but also the possibility of having a fruitful 
policy dialogue on issues more directly related to the objective of 
this aid modality. 
The recommendation to not use budget support as leverage for 
influencing governance does not mean that donors should not raise 
their governance concerns with a recipient government. But such a 
dialogue on democracy and human rights issues should be held 
separately from the dialogue on budget support. 
In view of the fact that both general and sector budget support 
use government budgeting and reporting systems, these instruments 
can be used for improving Public Financial Management (PFM) and 
domestic accountability institutions. The combination of policy 
dialogue and accompanying technical assistance has proven to be 
effective, in particular for PFM and horizontal accountability 
institutions such as Supreme Audit Institutions. As complementary 
measures to budget support, donors should also consider 
supporting institutions for vertical accountability (the demand side), 
like parliament and civil society. Donors are recommended to also 
use other soft incentives like promoting participation in 
international networks. 
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The evidence shows that strengthening PFM systems and 
domestic accountability institutions brings more corruption cases 
into the open and sometimes also leads to more attention for 
corruption in parliament, in the media and among civil society. 
Donors should be satisfied with these positive effects. Similarly, to 
the case of promoting democracy and human rights, the policy 
dialogue should not be used as leverage for combating corruption. 
This means that donors should not punish revealed corruption by 
suspensions and withdrawals of budget support. The costs of these 
(threats of) suspensions in terms of reduced effectiveness of budget 
support are much larger than the very uncertain possible benefits.  
The budget support dialogue can also focus on poverty reduction 
policies or on policies to foster achievement of the SDGs. As 
mentioned above, general budget support can focus on strategic, 
macro and cross-cutting issues related to these objectives, while 
sector budget support can deal with more detailed sector policies. 
In their synthesis of EC-commissioned budget support evaluations, 
Lawson et al. (2014: 85) recommend to focus budget support on the 
reduction of income poverty and inequality. This is based on the 
observation that public policies in recipient countries did not pay 
sufficient attention to these goals, and that the policy dialogue on 
budget support did not prioritise them either. They recommend 
“increased attention for agriculture and the productive sectors, as 
well as to infrastructure and employment creation” in budget 
support. However, no matter how important these topics are, it is 
not so clear that budget support resources or the policy dialogue are 
able to contribute to them. First, providing budget support implies 
funding the public sector. Whilst public resources can build 
infrastructure, there is no obvious link between these resources and 
strengthening productive sectors or increasing employment. 
Second, it is doubtful whether (most) donors 29  have sufficient 
analytical capacity for a meaningful participation in a policy dialogue 
on these topics. Donors can raise attention for the reduction of 
income poverty and inequality in the policy dialogue, and they can 
offer to finance studies on how public policies can become more 
                                                 
29 The World Bank is an exception, but the Bank tends to dominate the dialogue 
with a particular view on these issues. Other donors may foster pluralism by, for 
example, commissioning studies by academics from other institutions.  
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pro-poor. The results of these studies can then provide inputs to the 
policy dialogue on pro-poor public policies. The budget support 
resources may help financing critical infrastructure for the poor, for 
example electricity, water, and roads, and they may contribute to 
social safety net programmes in recipient countries. All in all, it 
seems important that the expectations with regard to the 
contribution of budget support resources to income poverty 
reduction are tempered.  
The policy dialogue around general or sector budget support 
should be based on ownership of the recipient country, implying 
that the number of indicators on the PAF should be limited. The 
more the participating donors succeed in harmonizing disbursement 
criteria, secure predictable funding, and respect ownership, the more 
effective general and sector budget support will be. 
This also means that the use of variable tranches should be 
avoided. Evidence from several studies shows that compliance with 
indicators for variable tranches is not better than for those related 
to fixed tranche (ITAD, 2014; Lawson et al., 2016; Ronsholt, 2014). 
On the negative side, variable tranches tend to lead to delays in 
disbursements, sometimes requiring governments to engage in 
additional borrowing as shown in chapter 2. The use of variable 
tranches also tends to focus the policy dialogue on compliance with 
these particular indicators, while there is often no reason to 
prioritise some indicators above others. In addition, these 
discussions on formal compliance with specific indicators may 
distract the attention from more strategic issues.  
  
       
96 
References 
ADE (2015). Evaluation conjointe de l'aide budgétaire au Burundi (2005-
2013): Rapport final. Report commissioned by International 
Cooperation and Development, EuropeAid, European 
Commission. ADE, ITAD and COWI.  
Arndt, C., Jones, S., & Tarp, F. (2010). Aid and growth: Have we 
come full circle? Journal of Globalization and Development, 1(2), 1-
26.  
Arndt, C., Jones, S., & Tarp, F. (2015). Assessing foreign aid's long 
run contribution to growth and development. World 
Development, 69(5), 6-18. 10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.12.016 
Arndt, C., & Oman, C. (2006). Uses and abuses of governance indicators. 
OECD Development Centre Studies. Paris: OECD.  
Beynon, J., & Dusu, A. (2010). Budget support and MDG performance. 
Report No. 2010/01. Brussels: European Commission.  
Bigsten, A. L., Platteau, J. P., & Tengstam, S. (2011). The aid 
effectiveness agenda: The benefits of going ahead. Gothenburg: Report 
funded by European Commission, implemented by SOGES.  
Bigsten, A., & Tengstam, S. (2015). International coordination and 
the effectiveness of aid. World Development, 69(1), 75.  
Bovens, M. (2010). Two concepts of accountability: Accountability 
as a virtue and as a mechanism. West European Politics, 33(5), 
946-967.  
Canagarajah, S., & Diesen, A. v. (2006). The poverty reduction 
strategy approach six years on: An examination of principles 
and practice in uganda. Development Policy Review, 24(6), 647-
667.  
     
 
97 
Collier, P., Guillaumont, P., Guillaumont, S., & Gunning, J. W. 
(1997). Redesigning conditionality. World Development, 25(9), 
1399-1407.  
Cordella, T., & Dell' Ariccia. (2003). Budget support versus project aid. 
Working Paper No. WP/03/88. Washington: IMF. 
Craig, D., & Porter, D. (2003). Poverty reduction strategies: A new 
convergence. World Development, 31(1), 53-69.  
De Kemp, A., Faust, J., & Leiderer, S. (2011). Between high 
expectations and reality: An evaluation of budget support in Zambia; 
synthesis report. Bonn, The Hague and Stockholm: BMZ, IOB 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Sida.  
De Kemp, A., & Lobbrecht, C. (2016). The gaps left behind: An 
evaluation of the impact of ending aid. IOB Evaluation No. 415. 
The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IOB.  
De Renzio, P. (2006). Aid, budgets and accountability: A survey 
article. Development Policy Review, 24(6), 627-646.  
De Renzio, P., Andrews, M., & Mills, Z. (2010). Evaluation of donor 
support to public financial management (PFM) reform in developing 
countries; analytical study if quantitative cross-country evidence, final 
report. Sida Evaluation No. 2010:5. Stockholm: Sida.  
Del Biondo K., & Orbie J. (2014). The European commission's 
implementation of budget support and the governance 
incentive tranche in Ethiopia: Democracy promoter or 
developmental donor? Third World Quarterly, 35(3), 411-427.  
Dijkstra, G. (2002). The effectiveness of policy conditionality: 
Eight country experiences. Development and Change, 33(2), 307-
334.  
       
98 
Dijkstra, G. (2013). Governance or poverty reduction? Assessing 
budget support in Nicaragua. Journal of Development Studies, 
49(1), 110-124.  
Dijkstra, G., de Kemp, A., & Bergkamp, D. (2012). Budget support: 
Conditional results; review of an instrument, 2000-2011. IOB 
Evaluation No. 369. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Policy and Operation Evaluation Department (IOB).  
Dijkstra, G., & Grigsby, A. (2010). Evaluation of general budget support 
to Nicaragua. The Hague: IOB, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Netherlands.  
Dijkstra, G., & De Kemp, A. (2015). Challenges in evaluating 
budget support and how to solve them. Evaluation, 21(1), 83-
98. doi:10.1177/1356389014564720 
ECO consult. (2011). Joint evaluation of budget support 
operations in Mali 2003-2009, volume 1. Brussels: European 
Commission.  
Faust, J., Leiderer, S., & Schmitt, J. (2012). Financing poverty 
alleviation vs. promoting democracy? multi-donor budget 
support in Zambia. Democratization, 19(3), 438-464. 
Faust, J., & Koch, S. (2014). Foreign aid and the domestic politics 
of European budget support. Bonn: Deutsche Institut für 
Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). 
Fernandes Antunes, A., Xu, K., James, C. D., Saksena, P., Van de 
Maele, N., Carrin, G., & Evans, D. B. (2013). General budget 
support: Has it benefitted the health sector? Health Economics, 
22(12), 1440.  
Grawe, R. (2010). Poverty reduction support credits: Vietnam country study. 
( No. 2010/9). Washington: The World Bank.  
Hayman, R. (2011). Budget support and democracy: A twist in the 
conditionality tale. Third World Quarterly, 32(4), 673-688.  
     
 
99 
High Level Forum. (2005). Paris declaration on aid effectiveness. Paris: 
OECD-DAC.  
Holvoet, N., & Inberg, L. (2015). Do gender targets and gender 
working groups contribute to more gender-sensitive budget 
support? Evidence from 14 Sub-Saharan African countries. 
The European Journal of Development Research, (5) 
doi:10.1057/ejdr.2015.58 
IDD and Associates. (2006). Evaluation of general budget support: 
Synthesis report. Birmingham: International Development 
Department, School of Public Policy.  
IEG and Particip GmbH. (2015). Joint evaluation of budget support to 
Uganda, final report, volume 1.  Washington: IEG, DfID, EC, 
Irish Aid, Government of Uganda.  
IEG, Committee on Development Effectiveness. (2010). Poverty 
Reduction Support Credits: An evaluation of World Bank support. 
No. CODE2009-0091). Washington: The World Bank.  
IEO (2004). IEO evaluation report on PRSPs and the PRGF. 
Washington: IMF, Independent Evaluation Office.  
ITAD (2013). Joint evaluation of budget support to Tanzania: Lessons 
learned and recommendations for the future, final report, volume 1. 
ADE, ITAD and COWI.  
ITAD (2014). Independent evaluation of budget support in Mozambique, 
final report, volume 1. ADE, ITAD and COWI.  
Kenny, C. (2017). Results, not receipts: Counting the right things in aid and 
corruption. Washington: Center for Global Development. 
Killick, T., with Gunatilaka, R., & Marr, A. (1998). Aid and the 
political economy of policy change. London/New York: Routledge. 
       
100 
Knoll, M. (2008). Budget support: A reformed approach or old 
wine in new skins? Report No. 190. Geneva: UNCTAD.  
Koch, S., Leiderer, S., Faust, J., & Molenaers, N. (2017). The rise 
and demise of European budget support: Political economy 
of collective European union donor action. Development Policy 
Review, 35(4), 455-473.  
Koch, S., & Molenaers, N. (2016). The Europeanisation of budget 
support: Do government capacity and autonomy matter? 
European Politics and Society, 17(1), 90-104.  
Langan, M. (2015). Budget support and Africa-European Union 
relations: Free market reform and neo-colonialism? European 
Journal of International Relations, 21(1), 101-121. 
10.1177/1354066113516813 
Larsson, K. (2018). The rise and fall of budget support in Swedish 
development cooperation. Report for EBA, Expert Group for Aid 
Studies.  
Lawson, A. et al. (2016). Evaluation of budget support to Sierra Leone 
2002-2015, final report volume 1. Report commissioned by 
DfID, UK and managed by Evaluation Unit of DG 
International Cooperation and Development, EuropeAid. 
Rotterdam: Ecorys and Fiscus.  
Lawson, A., Boadi, G., Ghartey, A., Ghartey, A., Killick, T., 
Kizilbashl, Z., & Williamson, T. (2007). Joint evaluation of multi-
donor budget support to Ghana: Evaluation of outputs, outcomes & 
impacts and recommendations on future design & management of Ghana 
MDBS. Oxford.  
Lawson, A., Booth, D., Harding, A., Hoole, D., & Naschold, F. 
(2002). General budget support evaluability study, phase 1. final 
synthesis report. Oxford/London: Oxford Policy Management 
and Overseas Development Institute.  
     
 
101 
Lawson, A., Booth, D., Msuya, M., Wangwe, S., & Williamson, T. 
(2005). Does general budget support work? Evidence from Tanzania. 
London: ODI.  
Lawson, A., Habas, J., Keita, M., Paul, E., Versailles, B., & Murray-
Zmijewski, A. (2011). Joint evaluation of budget support operations in 
Mali 2003-2009; final report. Report commissioned by 
European Commission, Belgium and Canada.  
Lawson, A., with Gonzalo Contreras, Gonzalo Alvarez de Toledo, 
and Virginie Morillon. (2014). Synthesis of budget support 
evaluations: Analysis of the findings, conclusions and recommendations of 
seven country evaluations of budget support, volume 1. Report 
commissioned by the European Commission, DG for 
Development and Cooperation, EuropeAid. Oxford UK: 
FISCUS and ADE.  
Leftwich, A. (1993). Governance, democracy and development in 
the Third World. Third World Quarterly, 14(3), 605-624.  
Lindberg, S. I. (2013). Mapping accountability: Core concept and 
subtypes. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 79(2), 
202-226. doi:10.1177/0020852313477761 
Molenaers N. (2012). The great divide? donor perceptions of 
budget support, eligibility and policy dialogue. Third World 
Quarterly, 33(5), 791-806.  
Molenaers, N., Gagiano, A., Smets, L., & Dellepiane, S. (2015). 
What determines the suspension of budget support? World 
Development, 75, 62-73.  
Molenaers, N., Cepinskas, L., & Jacobs, B. (2010). Budget support 
and policy/political dialogue: Donors practices in handling (political) 
crises. No. 2010-06). Antwerp: University of Antwerp/IOB.  
National Audit Office. (2008). Department of international development: 
Providing budget support to developing countries. (Report by the 
       
102 
Comptroller and Auditor General for the House of 
Commons, HC session 2007-2008). London: NAO.  
Nilsson, M. (2004). Effects of budget support: A discussion of early 
evidence. UTV Working Paper No. 4. Stockholm: Sida. 
OED (2004). The poverty reduction strategy initiative, an 
independent evaluation of the World Bank's support through 
2003. Washington: World Bank, Operations Evaluation 
Department.  
Orth, M., Schmitt, J., Krisch, F., & Oltsch, S. (2017). What we know 
about the effectiveness of budget support: Evaluation synthesis. Bonn: 
DEVAL, German Institute for Development Evaluation.  
Ouattara, B., & Strobl, E. (2008). Aid, policy and growth: Does aid 
modality matter? Review of World Economics, 144(2), 347-365.  
Particip GmbH. (2016). Evaluation de l' appui budgétaire au Burkina 
Faso (2009-2014), rapport final, volume 1. Report commissioned 
by International Cooperation and Development, EuropeAid, 
European Commission. 
Renard, R. (2007). The cracks in the new aid paradigm. In P. 
Hoebink (Ed.), The Netherlands yearbook of international 
cooperation. Assen: Van Gorcum. 
Rogerson, A. (2005). Aid harmonisation and alignment: Bridging 
the gaps between reality and the paris reform agenda. 
Development Policy Review, 23(5), 531-552.  
Ronsholt, E. (2014). Review of budget support evaluations. Evaluation 
Study No. 1. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Denmark, DANIDA.  
Schmitt, J. (2017). Budget support, budget transparency and 
domestic accountability in Mozambique. The European Journal 
of Development Research, 29(1), 246-262. 
     
 
103 
Stewart, F., & Wang, M. (2003). Do PRSPs empower poor 
countries and disempower the World Bank, or is it the other 
way round? QEH Working Paper Series No. 108. Oxford: 
Queen Elizabeth House.  
Swedlund, H. J. (2013). From donorship to ownership? Budget 
support and donor influence in Rwanda and Tanzania. Public 
Administration & Development, 33(5), 357.  
Tavakoli, H., & Smith, G. (2013). Back under the microscope: 
Insights from evidence on budget support. Development Policy 
Review, 31(1), 59-74.  
Tinbergen, J. (1952). On the theory of economic policy. Amsterdam: 
North Holland. 
Van der Linde, M., & Valmarana, C. (2012). Evaluating budget 
support: Methodological approach. Report of the Budget Support 
Evaluation Steering Group. Paris: OECD DAC.  
White, H. (1996). Evaluating programme aid, introduction and 
synthesis. IDS Bulletin, 27(4), 1-13.  
White, H., & Dijkstra, A. G. (2003). Programme aid and development: 
Beyond conditionality. London: Routledge. 
Whitfield, L. (Ed.). (2009). The politics of aid: African strategies 
for dealing with donors. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wolff, S. (2015). EU budget support as a transnational policy 
instrument: Above and beyond the state? Public Administration, 
93(4), 922-939.  
Woll, B. (2008). Donor harmonisation and government ownership: 
Multi-donor budget support in Ghana. The European Journal of 
Development Research, 20(1), 74-87.  
       
104 
Wood, B., Betts, J., Etta, F., Gayfer, J., Kabell, D., Ngwira, N., 
Samaranayake, M. (2011). The evaluation of the Paris Declaration: 
Final report. Copenhagen.  
World Bank. (1998). Assessing aid: What works, what doesn't, and why. 
Oxford/New York/Toronto: Oxford University Press for the 
World Bank. 
  
     
 
105 
List of abbreviations 
CEF Comprehensive Evaluation Framework 
CRS Creditor Reporting System 
DAC Development Assistance Committee 
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency 
Deval German Institute for Development Evaluation 
DfID Directorate for International Development 
GBS General Budget Support 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HDI Human Development Index 
IOB Policy and Operations Evaluation Department 
MDGs Millennium Development Goals 
ODA Official Development Assistance 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
PAF Performance Assessment Framework 
PFM Public Financial Management 
PRS Poverty Reduction Strategy 
PRSC Poverty Reduction Support Credit 
QCA Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
SAI Supreme Audit Institution 
SBS Sector Budget Support 
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals 
Sida Swedish International Development Agency 
UP Underlying Principles 
 
       
106 
Previous EBA-reports  
2018:03 How predictable is Swedish aid? A study of exchange rate volatility, 
Númi Östlund 
2018:02 Building Bridges Between International Humanitarian and 
Development Responses to Forced Migration, Alexander Kocks, Ruben 
Wedel, Hanne Roggemann, Helge Roxin 
2018:01 DFIs and Development Impact: an evaluation of Swedfund, Stephen 
Spratt, Peter O’Flynn, Justin Flynn 
2017:12 Livslängd och livskraft: Vad säger utvärderingar om svenska 
biståndsinsatsers hållbarhet? Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys 
2017:11 Sweden’s Financing of UN Funds and Programmes: Analyzing the 
Past, Looking to the Future, Stephen Browne, Nina Connelly, Thomas 
G. Weiss 
2017:10 Seven Steps to Evidence-Based Anticorruption: A Roadmap, Alina 
Mungiu-Pippidi 
2017:09 Geospatial analysis of aid: A new approach to aid evaluation, Ann-
Sofie Isaksson 
2017:08 Research capacity in the new global development agenda, Måns 
Fellesson 
2017:07 Research Aid Revisited – a historically grounded analysis of future 
prospects and policy options, David Nilsson, Sverker Sörlin  
2017:06 Confronting the Contradiction – An exploration into the dual purpose 
of accountability and learning in aid evaluation, Hilde Reinertsen, Kristian 
Bjørkdahl, Desmond McNeill 
2017:05 Local peacebuilding – challenges and opportunities, Joakim Öjendal, 
Hanna Leonardsson, Martin Lundqvist 
2017:04 Enprocentmålet – en kritisk essä, Lars Anell 
2017:03 Animal health in development – it’s role for poverty reduction and 
human welfare, Jonathan Rushton, Arvid Uggla, Ulf Magnusson 
     
 
107 
2017:02 Do Anti-Discrimination Measures Reduce Poverty Among 
Marginalised Social Groups? Rachel Marcus, Anna Mdee, Ella Page 
2017:01 Making Waves: Implications of the irregular migration and refugee 
situation on Official Development Assistance spending and practices in Europe, 
Anna Knoll, Andrew Sherriff 
2016:11 Revitalising the policy for global development, Per Molander 
2016:10 Swedish Development Cooperation with Tanzania – Has It Helped 
the Poor?, Mark McGillivray, David Carpenter, Oliver Morrissey, 
Julie Thaarup 
2016:09 Exploring Donorship – Internal Factors in Swedish Aid to Uganda, 
Stein-Erik Kruse 
2016:08, Sustaining a development policy: results and responsibility for the 
Swedish policy for global development Måns Fellesson, Lisa Román 
2016:07 Towards an Alternative Development Management Paradigm? 
Cathy Shutt 
2016:06 Vem beslutar om svenska biståndsmedel? En översikt, 
Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys 
2016:05 Pathways to change: Evaluating development interventions with 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), Barbara Befani 
2016:04 Swedish responsibility and the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals, Magdalena Bexell, Kristina Jönsson 
2016:03 Capturing complexity and context: evaluating aid to education, 
Joel Samoff, Jane Leer, Michelle Reddy 
2016:02 Education in developing countries what policies and programmes affect 
learning and time in school? Amy Damon, Paul Glewwe, Suzanne 
Wisniewski, Bixuan Sun 
2016:01 Support to regional cooperation and integration in Africa – what 
works and why? Fredrik Söderbaum, Therese Brolin 
2015:09 In search of double dividends from climate change interventions evidence 
from forest conservation and household energy transitions, G. Köhlin, S.K. 
Pattanayak, E. Sills, E. Mattsson, M. Ostwald, A. Salas, D. Ternald 
       
108 
2015:08  Business and human rights in development cooperation – has 
Sweden incorporated the UN guiding principles? Rasmus Klocker Larsen, 
Sandra Atler 
2015:07 Making development work: the quality of government approach, Bo 
Rothstein and Marcus Tannenberg 
2015:06 Now open for business: joint development initiatives between the 
private and public sectors in development cooperation, Sara Johansson de 
Silva, Ari Kokko and Hanna Norberg 
2015:05 Has Sweden injected realism into public financial management reforms 
in partner countries? Matt Andrews 
2015:04 Youth, entrepreneurship and development, Kjetil Bjorvatn 
2015:03 Concentration difficulties? An analysis of Swedish aid proliferation, 
Rune Jansen Hagen 
2015:02 Utvärdering av svenskt bistånd – en kartläggning, Expertgruppen 
för biståndsanalys  
2015:01 Rethinking Civil Society and Support for Democracy, Richard 
Youngs  
2014:05 Svenskt statligt internationellt bistånd i Sverige: en översikt, 
Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys  
2014:04 The African Development Bank: ready to face the challenges of a 
changing Africa? Christopher Humphrey  
2014:03 International party assistance – what do we know about the effects? 
Lars Svåsand  
2014:02 Sweden´s development assistance for health – policy options to support 
the global health 2035 goals, Gavin Yamey, Helen Saxenian, Robert 
Hecht, Jesper Sundewall and Dean Jamison  
2014:01 Randomized controlled trials: strengths, weaknesses and policy 
relevance, Anders Olofsgård 
EXPERTGRUPPEN  FÖR  BISTÅNDSANALYS  -
EBA  -  ÄR  EN  STATLIG  KOMMITTÉ  SOM
ANALYSERAR  OCH  UTVÄRDERAR  SVENSKT
INTERNATIONELLT BISTÅND. WWW.EBA.SE
THE EXPERT GROUP FOR AID STUDIES - EBA -
IS  A  GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE ANALYZING
AND EVALUATING SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT AID. WWW.EBA.SE
